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INTRODUCTION
In a perfect world, contract law would not require courts to go
beyond enforcement of the contract that the parties expressly agreed to;
courts would not have to intervene in any other way or perform any more
of an active role than to ascertain the intention of the parties and ensure
that it is carried out. In a perfect world, the terms of the bargain would be
in the hands of the parties; for the parties to the contract are in the best
position to know how to make a perfect world even better through their
exchange.
Yet we know that the world is imperfect in ways that hinder the
parties’ ability to achieve bargains or complete contracts. Courts may
intervene in contracts by interpreting them, by filling in the terms left
unspecified by the parties, and by imposing liability on parties who have
not reached a bargain. When a court intervenes in these ways, the key
issue is methodological: what states of our imperfect world explain and
justify such judicial intervention? When can courts outperform the parties
in improving welfare, and what opportunities and risks do they face when
they attempt to shape the exchange in ways that the parties could not?
This methodological issue is the holy grail of contract scholarship and
provides a basis for understanding how contract law is shaped and how it
has evolved.
Stripped to its essentials, this issue is fundamental to all of law; it is
the question faced by courts and legislatures whenever they intervene by
adopting or revising any common-law rule if the effect is to provide terms
that are not explicitly agreed to by the parties. Whether a court awards a
property right, allocates a loss under tort law, imposes a particular
liability rule in contract law,1 or supplies terms in incomplete contracts,2
the issue is a methodological one of when and how courts should
intervene. 3
1.
Thus, the court “intervenes” when it provides expectation damages for a
contract breach since those remedial terms were not explicitly agreed to by the parties or
when it imposes liability to govern precontractual negotiation obligations.
2.
See Richard E. Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract
Method, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 785, 803 (1982).
3.
This Article will use “interventions” in the sense that institutional, financial,
and behavioral economics use it: “adding to or subtracting from what, realistically (that is,
giving the express terms their ordinary meaning), parties have said explicitly in their
arrangement.” E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law (Feb. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Coffey e-mail (Feb. 17,
2003)] (on file with author).
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The subject of this Symposium, Freedom from Contract, also raises
methodological issues of legal intervention. In answering the question of
how free parties are to negotiate without contractual consequences and
when the parties’ exercise of the freedom to contract should be respected,
the “freedoms” should be considered together. Viewing them as separate
freedoms (freedom not to contract versus freedom to contract) will impair
an instrumental understanding of contractual freedom.
Resolving the scope of the freedom to or not to contract really poses
the question of whether courts should intervene by adding terms or
imposing liability rules when parties have not used the orthodox signals
for manifesting consent, even if that approach results in more instances of
contract liability.
Thus far, most accounts examining the legal intervention question
have analyzed the issue by examining the relative capacity of the parties
or the courts to acquire information about future events and states of the
world in the context of adding terms to a contract.4 One strand of the
dominant scholarship has emphasized the costs and difficulty that the
parties have in fully specifying their intentions. Within this tradition,
judicial intervention is justified because it saves the parties the transaction
costs of bargaining over terms that are unknowable or expensive to
ascertain and negotiate ex ante.

That meaning of legal intervention in the sense of adding terms not explicitly agreed
on is to be distinguished from the ordinary meaning of courts intervening only when asked
to do so by one of the parties. Id. (stating that “they do not ‘intervene’ (normally) in the
sense of officiously poking their noses, unasked into settling controversies”). The partybased call for legal intervention, usually initiated by a lawsuit, does not necessarily
involve the court in legal intervention in the sense of adding to or subtracting from terms if
the agreement is complete and unambiguous.
Of course, the particular methodological justifications for intervention will differ in
the context of torts and contracts, for example, since “the structure and content of
explanatory justifications of interventions (or abstentions therefrom) may be dependent on
whether a dispute is within the contemplation of precontroversy, assent-originated
relationships or whether instead, the conflict arises in the externalities setting where actors
have not, before the dispute-causing conduct, bargained over the matter in controversy.”
Ronald J. Coffey, Methodological Perspective 1–2 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author). For a trenchant analysis of when and on what basis courts should
intervene in the torts context, see generally Peter M. Gerhart, Tort Duty to Protect Others:
A Synthesis (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Once this broad understanding
of legal intervention is understood, one can conclude that “there is no ‘non-interventionist’
option ever.” E-mail from Robert W. Gordon, Professor of Law, Yale Law School, to
Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law
(Feb. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Gordon e-mail (Feb. 14, 2003)] (on file with the author).
4.
Recent commentators have emphasized the need to explicitly confront a
different source of uncertainty involving behavior. There is a distinction drawn between
the failure of contracts to completely account for external states of the world and for
parties’ behaviors. See, e.g., Pierpaolo Battigalli & Giovanni Maggi, Rigidity, Discretion,
and the Costs of Writing Contracts, 92 AMER. ECON. REV. 798, 799 (2002).
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Another strand of the literature, represented by the new formalists,
emphasizes the difficulties associated with terms that depend on
unobservable or unverifiable information. This approach suggests that
while ex ante there is uncertainty about the future state of the world, and
parties therefore “must write a contract that measures performance based
on an incomplete specification of future circumstances,”5 courts should be
modest about intervening. They should not do so if it would contravene
the parties’ own intentions not to solve an ex ante uncertainty problem
with a solution or term that depends on unobservable or unverifiable
information. Relying on the implicit assumption that many law-supplied
rules and interventions are misguided because they depend on courts
supplying terms that depend on types of information that are either
unverifiable or unobservable, they eschew law-supplied rules and
advocate a return to plain-meaning contract interpretation.6
Each strand of the literature contains rich and valid points. Neither
one, however, provides a complete understanding of when and why courts
should intervene to supply terms or liability rules or of how precisely such
intervention would advance or hinder the parties’ welfare when certain
factors such as uncertainty, opportunism, and sunk costs are present.
Thus, they cannot resolve whether intervention, with its concomitant
reduction in freedom from contract, advances welfare or not. Each strand
seems to focus on uncertainty about the future state of the world or nature
that afflicts the parties. The first approach, the hypothetical bargain,
assumes that while parties often lack needed information to negotiate a
complete contract, the courts can supply the information needed to
maximize the joint gains for the parties by hypothesizing the bargain that
the parties would have reached under ideal conditions without the
informational deficits. The hypothetical bargain advocates assume that
judicial intervention will increase the parties’ welfare despite the
relatively narrower scope of the freedom not to contract.
The competing methodology of the new formalists assumes that the
information problem should not be solved by courts because doing so
would involve the court in supplying terms ex post that the parties
themselves would not have agreed to ex ante due to its inaccessible
nature. Such an intervention would lead to reversal costs in the future as
parties attempted to opt out of such rules that ignored the parties’ own
5.
E-mail from Robert E. Scott, Professor of Law, University of Virginia
School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law (Feb. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Scott e-mail (Feb. 11, 2004)] (on
file with author).
6.
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 550 (2003) (embracing a default approach based on
“textualist” interpretation). Sometimes this refusal results in freedom from contract
liability by increasing the number of unenforceable contracts.
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preferences. Courts themselves should therefore not supply rules that
depend on verifying information about what state of world has
developed. 7 Consequently, they argue that courts should generally
decline to intervene with law-supplied default rules as they will be
“useless or inefficient.”8 They view the increased willingness of courts to
intervene with terms and the concomitant reduction in the freedom not to
contract as detrimental to the parties’ welfare.
This Article develops a model of legal intervention that focuses on
structural barriers that make it difficult for parties to solve a key problem
of contracting: opportunism.
The uncertainty of anticipating the
particular ways in which parties have a “propensity to diverge”9 or to act
opportunistically explains why parties are not able to achieve fully
contingent contracts to control such behaviors. To date, the full
implications of this type of uncertainty about parties’ behavior
(behavioral uncertainty) have not been sufficiently incorporated into
models assessing legal intervention nor into models demarcating the
appropriate realms for freedom from contract and freedom to contract.
Were it not for uncertainty about the likelihood of and propensity for
opportunistic behavior by a party, the parties could fully solve and control
by contract the propensity of parties to be opportunistic. Absent
uncertainty, there would be complete knowledge about the probability of
opportunism and the myriad forms it would take. “There could be no
asymmetry and opportunism would be known and adequately dealt with
by an explicit, fully contingent contract.”10 However, because of
uncertainty about the types of behavior affecting one’s counterparty and
because of bounded rationality and cost issues, parties do not effectively
deal with opportunism by contract.
The parties’ inability to deal with the behavioral uncertainty problem
issue by explicit contract may pose particular problems when parties
invest sunk costs that are nonrecoverable. Absent sunk costs, parties
could easily arrange an alternative exchange, and a contract would not be
7.
It is a new formalism because it is based on instrumental justifications.
Traditional formalism lacked an instrumental focus; its proponents tended “to deduce rules
from first principles that characterized classical formalism as practiced by the late-19th
century Langdellians.” Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract,
94 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 851 n.11 (2000) [hereinafter Scott, Formalism].
8.
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 594.
9.
E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law (May 2, 1996) [hereinafter Coffey e-mail (May 2,
1996)] (on file with author).
10.
E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve
University Law School, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve
University Law School, (June 10, 2003) [hereinafter Coffey e-mail (June 10, 2003)] (on
file with author); see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
CAPITALISM § 2.2, at 56–59 (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM].
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necessary. However, the presence of sunk costs and the behavioral
uncertainties make it important to find some means of controlling
opportunism, because the consequence of not dealing with it is the loss of
an investment.
Where parties have invested sunk costs and cannot readily sell the
investment, there is opportunism, and it is uncertain ex ante what the
probabilities are about the likelihood that one party may act
opportunistically. Parties may not be able to devise contract terms that
control such opportunism. Yet the possibility of such opportunistic
behavior limits the value of exchange by raising the risks for the other
party. If such opportunistic behavior is not controlled, some deals that
could have improved welfare will not be made and other deals will have
benefits reduced from the levels that might have otherwise been
achieved. 11
As a result, it is in the interests of the parties and of society to
successfully control such opportunistic behavior. When parties succeed,
they are better off; the gains from exchange increase and the benefits of
exchange to society are maximized.
Often, the parties are able to deal with opportunistic behavior
without court intervention.12 When the parties are able to structure their
relationships to reduce opportunistic behavior, they improve gains from
trade on their own. Thus, there is reason to respect the parties’
contractual choices. The parties may rely on nonlegal sanctions to curb
opportunistic behavior. In such cases, the need for legal intervention may
be reduced.
Legal intervention may be called for, however, when the sunk
costs—uncertainty about the likelihood of and the presence of
opportunistic behavior—are present and the parties’ costs of reducing
opportunism on their own are more costly than a judicial alternative.13
11.
These losses amount to deadweight losses. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 172 (1991).
12.
For a discussion of how trust may sometimes curb opportunistic behavior but
only when the payoff is low enough, see Karen Eggleston et al., The Design and
Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 115–16
(2000).
13.
Courts might merely supplement private devices as when courts enforce
trade usages that reduce opportunism. In other instances, courts more broadly may
intervene by supplying terms or liability rules. If intervention is called for, the parties’
freedom not to contract may be reduced.
The problem with treating freedom as an intrinsic goal is that it is often used
to set up the dichotomy that you seek to avoid—to set up the kind of ultimacy
that seems to trump most other goals or that can only be trumped by
dichotomous goals. That is, one might say that freedom from contract has
intrinsic value—that is an ultimacy—that can . . . only be invaded in order to
reach some other value—some other ultimacy. That is a common form of
legal argument but runs into the objection that . . . no intrinsic value is
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One must approach the issue of legal intervention in incomplete
contracts from a broad perspective and must articulate a general theory of
judicial intervention in a way that can resolve issues from the general to
the particular, from the law’s decision to supply performance obligations,
formulate the good-faith doctrine, and add particular terms. Courts must
consider whether a particular intervention will achieve certain
instrumental goals, such as an increase in social welfare, given general
assumptions as to how parties behave on average.14
Judicial intervention allows parties to reduce the risk and facilitate
exchanges where sunk costs may be high, opportunistic behavior is a risk
and there is uncertainty about the likelihood of opportunism. Parties can
then enter into bargains with the assurance that they can call on the court
to intervene if opportunistic behavior occurs. That knowledge improves
the welfare of both parties and of society as a whole.
The guiding principle for legal intervention is thus whether the law
can increase gains from trade by overcoming barriers that prevent the
parties from devising complete contracts to control opportunism in
advance on their own.15 Courts should decide whether legal intervention
will increase gains from trade by projecting what consequences, both ex
ante and ex post, legal intervention will produce. 16
Naturally, even when judicial intervention is justified under the
behavioral uncertainty, sunk cost, and opportunism rationale, courts must
be sensitive to the difficulty of such intervention and the institutional
factors that make such intervention costly. Courts must also consider the
possibility that a default rule policing opportunism by one party could
actually increase opportunism by the other party in future cases.17 The
courts must therefore consider the information dynamics that affect
intervention strategies, and the possibilities of counteropportunism, but
they may find those considerations outweighed by the substantive value
of the intervention for increasing gains from trade.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the role of contract
law in private exchange. Part II summarizes the existing literature on
absolute. The problem with arguing from ultimacies is that the analytical
framework for knowing when intrinsic values sacrificed for other values is
generally poorly worked out.
E-mail from Peter M. Gerhart, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School
of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law (Apr. 30, 2004).
14.
The formalists have neglected to consider the characteristics that are
common to individuals by focusing exclusively on the heterogeneity of parties. See Scott,
Formalism, supra note 7, at 848.
15.
Coffey e-mail (May 2, 1996), supra note 9. I will not revisit the issue of
whether maximizing welfare is an appropriate goal for contract law in this Article.
16.
Coffey e-mail (Feb. 17, 2003), supra note 3.
17.
Scott e-mail (Feb. 11, 2004), supra note 5.
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court-supplied terms. The arguments for and against intervention turn on
the comparative ability of the parties (and the court) to get the information
they need to improve the exchange. Part III shows how this informationdriven account of intervention is incomplete because it focuses on
particular solutions to the ex ante uncertainty problem that are themselves
fraught with difficulties. Part III focuses on the fact of uncertainties about
the state of the world and about one’s counterparty (involving both the
adverse-selection problem and the moral-hazard problem) and then
explains how parties or courts might seek to mitigate the effects of costs
of opportunism and maximize joint surplus by a variety of strategies. The
Section looks broadly at an array of solutions to the ex ante uncertainty
problem given the behavioral uncertainties that can also impair the
profitability of exchange in incomplete contracts. Part IV assesses
nonlegal strategies for dealing with such behavior, for those nonlegal
strategies may make judicial intervention less pressing and therefore less
justified. A rigorous comparative analysis of legal and nonlegal
sanctions, including commercial norms and alternative private strategies,
is needed to determine whether parties could solve their problems and
constrain behavior by private means (whether contractual or otherwise) or
whether legal intervention would be justified as the most efficient solution
to certain contractual problems. Part V shows how courts can combine
the insights about information deficiencies and sunk cost attributes to
develop a coherent and welfare-improving methodology of intervention to
supply terms and liability rules in the context of precontractual
negotiations. Part VI explores the implications of the framework for
supplying liability rules or terms in the preliminary negotiation setting,
Section 45 option contracts18 and the subcontracting context. Part VII of
the Article suggests several constituent factors to help determine when
legal intervention is justified.
I.

THE ROLE OF CONTRACT LAW, CONSENT, AND WELFARE
PROMOTION IN PRIVATE EXCHANGE

To understand the justification for the law’s intervening with liability
rules or terms in incomplete contracts, it is first important to understand
how a need for a law of contract arose to mediate what are essentially
private exchanges.
When parties exchange items simultaneously, the need for contract
law is slight. 19 The need for a system to mediate exchanges20 between
18.
Section 45 option contracts make offers irrevocable upon part performance
by the offeree. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45 (1981).
19.
“[I]f all transactions took place instantaneously, as in the case of an everyday
retail purchase, the need for enforcement rules would be slight.” MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN,
CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 3 (3d ed. 1998).
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private parties arises when parties exchange goods or services on a
nonsimultaneous basis. The party delaying performance may offer a
promise of future performance. Contract law then becomes important; it
lends state sanction to the enforcement of private promises.21
The justification for contract law rests on the assent of the parties.
Contract facilitates autonomy22 by enforcing duties voluntarily assumed
by the parties. 23 It is a key means by which the state intervenes to
“facilitate . . . human freedom.”24
The enforcement of contract law also promotes efficient exchanges
and gains from trade. 25 Without the threat of a sanction for breach, the
parties might avoid a contract altogether.26 Equally important, the
20.
Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, The Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES IN
ECONOMIC THEORY, FIFTH WORLD CONGRESS 71 (Truman F. Bewley ed., 1987).
21.
State enforcement of contracts encourages beneficial reliance in which
parties rely in advance of the contractual performance date because they are secure that
their reliance will be protected. Were state sanctions not offered, parties would be
reluctant to rely in advance of the performance date even when it was more efficient or
advantageous to take steps in advance of that time. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1277–
78 (1980). Of course, enforcement of promises may also cause detrimental effects as
enforcement may cause parties to curtail their promising in order to avoid liability. Id. at
1265. Contract law must carefully weigh these effects to “provide[] the optimal balance
between the beneficial and harmful effects of promising.” Id.
22.
Theories of contract law that emphasize autonomy and moral issues
associated with consent are referred to as “deontological.” See, e.g., Jody Kraus, The
Methodological Commitments of Contract Law 82 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, Law &
Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 01-2, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=269975 (on file with author). Autonomy
concerns play a central role in the contract theories of Charles Fried but will not be a focus
of this Article. E.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 2 (1981); see also AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM
4, 17, 60–63 (1999) (focusing on the core value of freedom as a way of bridging the
utilitarian, consequentialist, and rights approaches).
23.
As Professor Jules Coleman points out, parties’ consent to a private
agreement does not mean that “they have agreed thereby to have their obligations to one
another enforced by the state (or by any other third party).” Jules L. Coleman et al., A
Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract
Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 639–40 (1989).
24.
Id. at 639. Coleman refers to H.L.A. Hart’s distinction between different
types of law: those which “facilitate as well as constrain human freedom . . . . Primary
rules impose obligations and thereby constrain behavior. Secondary rules empower
individuals to create relations that confer rights and impose duties. Thus, the criminal law
constrains individual liberty; the law of contracts enhances it.” Id. (footnotes omitted).
25.
Parties “engage in trading one thing for another . . . up to the point where
such activity produces no further mutual advantage.” CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 19, at 2.
26.
Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical
Judicial Error, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 749, 759 (2000) (discussing neoclassical assumptions
underlying legal sanctions and their effects on contract formation and investment but
suggesting legal sanctions do not achieve these positive effects because “courts are
radically incompetent”).
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assurance of a sanction and the prospect of a remedy encourage both
parties to invest in a contract.27

27.
As Posner posits, “[w]ith this assurance, Seller has the proper incentive to
invest in the customized widget, and Buyer has the proper incentive to invest in
anticipation of delivery.” Id.; see also Avery Katz, When Should An Offer Stick? The
Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249,
1267 (1996).
Concern about providing proper incentives extends to the precontractual period as
well. See Avery Wiener Katz, Contract Formation and Interpretation, in 1 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 425, 427–28 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998); see also Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 481, 491–94 (1996); Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral
Hazard, and Sunk Costs: A Default Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 621, 680–81 (1993) (examining importance of providing liability default rule in
precontractual context to encourage investment).
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INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION BASED ON THE FEASIBLE SOLUTIONS TO
INFORMATIONAL DEFICITS
A.

Ignoring Informational Deficits

The role for contract law outlined above presents little controversy.
The court simply gives effect to the terms expressly agreed upon by the
parties and in so doing simultaneously facilitates both autonomy and
efficiency goals. However, because the world is imperfect, there are
significant obstacles to the parties achieving complete bargained-for
contracts that are fully specified.
Early courts and commentators ignored the problem of
incompleteness in contracting in ways that had various implications for
what role a court should play in intervening with terms not expressly
agreed to.
Contract law avoided directly grappling with the methodology
underlying judicial intervention in incomplete contracts. Courts were not
concerned with why contracts might be incomplete, and their response
was simple. Courts purportedly declined to complete contracts for the
parties28 because they assumed that court-supplied terms would violate
the central premise of contract law—that only contracts voluntarily
assented to by the parties should be enforced.29
Limiting judicial enforcement to the privately agreed-upon terms
could be justified on moral grounds and contractual intent. The parties’
explicit consent provided evidence of intention and a moral basis for
enforcement.30
Neoclassical economics similarly ignored any barriers to contractual
completeness. It unrealistically assumed that the contracts entered into by
the parties would be complete and efficient31 because they posited an
28.
See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 1 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §§ 3.27–.29 (2d
ed. 1998). However, the reality was quite otherwise since “if the terms aren’t specified,
and they often are not, the court has to put them in—expectation damages, what is a
‘reasonable time’ for delivery, whether a party has ‘substantially performed.’” Gordon email (Feb. 14, 2003), supra note 3.
29.
Law-and-economics scholars face this difficulty when they attempt to
provide a rationale providing for terms that parties would have agreed to. Coleman et al.,
supra note 23, at 639–40.
30.
Without express terms, there was no guarantee that terms supplied by a court
would reflect the parties’ contractual intent and thus, such terms would lack moral force
under autonomy principles.
31.
“The outer limits of hyperrationality reasoning are reached by the ArrowDebreu model of comprehensive contracting, according to which contracts for all goods
and services across all future contingencies are made among all agents at the outset.”
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 8 n.4 (1996) [hereinafter
WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS].
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idealized world of no transaction costs.32 In this world, contracting
parties would foresee all possible future contingencies33 regarding the
future state of the world affecting the payoff from the contract and
completely provide for them.34 The contract price would reflect and
account for different future events and states of the world, and the parties’
contracts would thereby maximize gains from trade. These neoclassical
economists assumed that “complete contracting is both feasible and
desirable.”35 Such assumptions fostered the conclusion that it was
unnecessary for courts to intervene.
A complete contract in the context of the sale of goods would tailor
the price the seller would charge according to differing states of the
seller’s costs that were actually realized.36 A low cost would trigger a
lower price charged to the buyer; a higher cost would force the buyer to
pay a higher price. In an ideal world, the parties could envision and
anticipate each state of the world that could materialize and provide a
tailored payoff amount for it. The court could simply enforce the agreedupon contract.
Complete contracts are Pareto efficient37 and obviate the need for
judicial intervention. Efficient contracts are “self-enforcing”38 because
32.
The possibility of a complete contract was more realistic in a simple, oneshot transaction where it was not necessary to anticipate events occurring over a long
period of time. The realization that such one-shot transactions are relatively rare in certain
economies can be traced to Professor Ian Macneil’s work. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil,
Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical,
and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 856–57 (1978); see also Jay M.
Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context: Unanswered Questions, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 737, 737 (“Symposium, commemorating Ian Macneil’s four decades as a contract
law teacher and scholar . . . .”).
33.
“A contract is said to be complete if the list of conditions on which actions
are based is exhaustive, that is, if the contract provides explicitly for all possible
conditions.” Steven Shavell, Contracts, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW supra note 27, at 436. “In the economics literature, a contract is
complete when it differentiates among all relevant future states of the world, and a third
party, such as a court, can verify, when necessary, which state has occurred.” Eggleston et
al., supra note 12, at 100.
34.
Eggleston et al., supra note 12, at 103.
35.
George M. Cohen, Implied Terms and Interpretation in Contract Law: The
Law and Economics Approach, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS: THE
REGULATION OF CONTRACTS 78, 82 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 1999),
available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/4400book.pdf [hereinafter Cohen, Implied Terms].
36
Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of
Incomplete Contracts and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 283 [hereinafter
Schwartz, Relational Contracts].
37.
“One state of affairs is a Pareto improvement over another if at least one
person benefits from the change and no one is hurt.” Daniel A. Farber, Economic
Efficiency and the Ex Ante Perspective, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 54, 58 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000).
The complete contract would be considered optimal because by carefully graduating the
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once a Pareto-optimal contract has been achieved, presumably neither
party would want to “defect” from such an arrangement since the contract
would benefit both parties.39
B.

Informational Deficits Recognized

Because parties cannot predict uncertain future events or states of the
world,40 ex ante, they lack information needed for complete contracts,41
especially in long-term relational contracts.42 Consequently, parties
cannot realistically achieve complete contracts, and many contracts
remain inefficiently incomplete.43 For example, parties may lack the
foresight to anticipate what quantities will be needed several years
hence44 and so they leave the quantity term open and at the same time
they delegate discretion to the buyer to determine its requirements. The
lack of completeness in long-term contracts raises the question of whether
and when a court should seek to complete a contract for the parties.45

payoffs to the possible different states of the world, the parties would have “assign[ed]
obligations efficiently across all possible future states.” Eggleston et al., supra note 12, at
103.
38.
Coleman et al., supra note 23, at 640; see also Bernard Black & Reiner
Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1912, 1912
(1996) (discussing elements of self-enforcing corporate structures which permit “outside
shareholders to protect themselves from insider opportunism with minimal resort to legal
authority”).
39.
Coleman et al., supra note 23, at 640 (“A fully specified contract is also an
equilibrium . . . .”).
40.
“We cannot know the future (at any cost) and some of the present (at costs
that are equal to benefits) . . . .” E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law,
Case Western Reserve University School of Law (June 30, 2003) [hereinafter Coffey, email (June 30, 2003)].
41.
Informational constraints include bounded rationality and asymmetries of
information.
42.
Recognition that long-term relational contracts pose particular problems in
contracting rests on the assumption that parties cannot “allocate future obligations and
payments in a way that maximizes the value of their contract.” Posner, supra note 26, at
751. Early recognition of the peculiar characteristics of relational contracts and the
difficulties that they posed for contracting can be traced to Macneil. See supra note 32.
43.
For example, while it might be more efficient to condition the price of a good
and tailor it to the yet to be realized demand, the contract is likely to remain
undifferentiated. Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 36, at 272.
44.
Id. at 295 (explaining that future demand is uncertain since it “is partly a
function of economic factors that can vary with time”).
45.
Of course, it would still be possible to treat these incomplete contracts as
obviating any need for court intervention, as economists did. They could read the
contract’s failure to address the contingency as meaning that the obligation was absolute,
or they could choose to treat the failure to cover the contingency as providing a total
“absence of legal consequence in the event the contingency materializes.” Gillian K.
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The different ways that scholars have analyzed the completeness
issue provide important elements for understanding how courts should
analyze the need for judicial intervention. The first step for a court is to
decide whether a contract is complete. Parties could include a clause,
lessening the burden on the court. The parties could state that the legal
obligations and rights of the parties stated in the contract would continue
to apply no matter what state of the world actually materialized. An
example of such a “catchall clause” might state “‘[t]he price term will be
x, and will apply regardless of any change in circumstances or conduct by
either party.’”46 If parties include such a clause, they are contracting in
the face of contractual uncertainty and deciding to take a risk to adhere to
their original contractual obligations no matter what state of the world
materializes. Judicial intervention—in the sense of adding terms for the
parties—in such cases would be unnecessary because the court would
apply the extant terms of the contract in all states of the world, regardless
of any hardship it caused.
Since parties, however, often do not state unequivocally that the
contract obligations would apply in all circumstances,47 courts must
decide whether a contract that fails to address certain events specifically
is complete or whether the failure renders the contract incomplete.48 If a
contract has a clause requiring delivery by a seller at a fixed price, the
court must decide if the price terms apply in all states of the world.
Exogenous events may make it difficult or impossible for a party to
perform. Government regulations, embargoes, or strikes (or the closing
of a canal) might all relate to the uncertainty of events in the future and
affect a party’s ability to perform its contractual obligations, yet the
contract might be silent on how such events affect the parties’ contract
obligations.
If a court interprets a contract with a price term (seemingly
complete) to obligate the buyer to buy at that price in all states of the
world, then the court, in effect, decides that the contract is complete. If a
court takes the opposite approach and refuses to enforce the price term in
a particular state of the world, then the court has decided the contract has
incompletely dealt with a state of the world which has materialized.49
Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 159, 160 (1994).
46.
Cohen, Implied Terms, supra note 35, at 80 (discussing catchall phrases).
47.
Id.
48.
Under one view, the contract is one in which the parties “unavoidably fail to
include terms that the parties would prefer to include . . . .” Hadfield, supra note 45, at
161. Courts sometimes hide their “choice” behind “rhetorical strategies” which “conceal
the existence of this discretion.” Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 36, at 273.
49.
Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 36, at 273 (“A court that wants to
excuse the buyer will supply a term and stress the parties’ failure to consider the situation
at hand . . . .”).
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A contract may be incomplete in the sense that the parties fail to
provide for a term and leave a literal gap.50 Parties may fail to agree on a
price of the goods to be delivered under a sales contract or they may fail
to agree on the quantity.
Many instances of contractual incompleteness derive from the
parties’ inability to predict future states of the world or the costs of
ascertaining the uncertain future. Because of those cognitive limitations,
the parties may fail to provide for different payoffs contingent on
different future states of the world. 51 The world is complicated, uncertain,
and there are many possible future states of the world, and a contract may
fail to account for such differing states.52
Contracts thus remain incomplete and coarsely partitioned for cost
considerations.53 Parties must weigh the costs of writing a provision
against the private gains to the parties in providing specifically for the
contingencies.54 This may be referred to subsequently as the “budget
constraint.”55 Although there has been a shift toward a greater
recognition of the fact of incompleteness, the accounts so far have
focused too narrowly on informational impediments that affect the parties
either in the ex ante phase of contracting, or on the particular problems of
observability or verifiability that may affect the parties’ ability to deal
with the ex ante uncertainty by postponing the identification of the
contours of performance until the state of the world has actually
materialized. Under certain circumstances, the parties’ ability to get
around the ex ante contracting difficulties and devise solutions to the ex
ante uncertainty problem are themselves beset with problems. For
example, as Hart and Moore explain, it may be difficult to specify in
advance the investment that one party should make. 56 Even if one
50.
Id. at 272.
51.
Eggleston et al., supra note 12, at 91. “In practice, however, many contracts
are quite simple. They divide the future into very crude partitions; they provide for
constant or close to constant payments across different outcomes; and the terms are easy to
understand.” Id. They are “insufficiently state-contingent.” Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE
L.J. 87, 92 n.29 (1989).
52.
Such a contract is incomplete because it “partitions future states or potential
contracting partners too coarsely.” Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 36, at 272
(internal quotations omitted).
53.
OLIVER D. HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 23 (1995).
54.
Of course, in some instances the gain to the parties of drafting a provision
will be low as “when there are a large number of low-probability contingencies that could
affect the value of contractual performance, and the efficient response to those
contingencies vary greatly and so cannot easily be specified in advance.” Cohen, Implied
Terms, supra note 35, at 81.
55.
Coffey e-mail (May 2, 1996), supra note 9.
56.
See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66
REV. ECON. STUD. 115, 115, 121 (1999).
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postpones the investment aspect of the contract until later on when
circumstances that affect the specialized investment have materialized, it
may be difficult to verify that the specialized investment has in fact
occurred.
Although it is important to understand that verifiability problems
might cause parties to avoid particular solutions to ex ante uncertainty
problems that depend on verifying inaccessible information, a key insight
that has been somewhat neglected is that at the heart of many contracting
problems is opportunism. The new formalists stress the impediments that
parties face in contracting in an uncertain world. They stress the fact that
parties who are confronted with such uncertainties about the future state
of the world will look for other ways to “measure performance based on
an incomplete specification of the future circumstances.”57 What is
evident to the architects of the new formalism is that parties striving to
come up with ways to measure whether the parties have performed their
obligations devised under ex ante uncertainty will avoid variables that are
themselves unverifiable or unobservable. For that reason, courts should
also avoid solutions that involve such unknowable variables.
While it is helpful to understand particular solutions that parties will
avoid—and that, therefore, courts should as well—to deal with the
problems of obligations crafted in an uncertain world, it is also important
to realize that when parties do encounter these uncertainties about the
future, particularly uncertainties about behavior, the parties will have an
incentive to control opportunistic behavior. The parties themselves may
craft solutions to the problem or the courts may do so. Presumably, the
preferred solution is the one that solves the problem at the least cost in the
sense that it has the lowest combination of losses from the opportunism
and the preventive costs undertaken to reduce the losses from
uncontrolled opportunism. Parties may decide that they can deal with
uncertainty about the future by postponing decisions that will be affected
by yet-to-materialize events until a future point in time. The party who
will be investing resources (seller) will be afforded an option at the later
point in time to present a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the noninvesting party
(buyer). Then, even if the events are nonverifiable, if they are observable
to the affected parties, then the option device may give the seller the
correct incentive to invest. In these imagined option scenarios, there must
be a commitment not to renegotiate or the parties will lack the correct
incentive to invest. The option device gives the parties the ability to
overcome ex ante uncertainty by postponing decisions until a later point
in time. This option, however, may only work if there is no ability to
renegotiate.58
57.
58.

Scott e-mail (Feb. 11, 2004), supra note 5.
See infra note 192.
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Incomplete contracts present a particular challenge for courts.
Unlike the situation of a complete contract where the parties’ agreement
provides tangible evidence of a value-maximizing trade, the incomplete
contract leaves courts in a quandary about what role they should play. It
is not clear which strategy, one of nonintervention or of judicial
intervention to complete the contract, will best maximize the parties’
welfare and gains from trade, 59 assuming the efficiency rationale for
contract enforcement.
The second major cause of contractual incompleteness stems from
behavioral uncertainty or strategic behavior.60 This uncertainty stems not
from uncertainty about what states of the world will materialize but about
how parties will act in withholding information ex ante about their past
and in withholding information about the one’s proclivities for
opportunistic behavior.61 Any party seeking to negotiate a favorable price
may choose to withhold damaging information about himself and the risks
he poses. 62 Even though disclosure would result in efficiencies and
permit the counterparty to take efficient precautions to deal accurately
with the risks of the contract relationship, the party with damaging
information will conceal it. The resulting contract will not differentiate
between different types of transactors posing different risks. Uncertainty
about performance can also arise if the party requesting performance
cannot observe how much the performer (the agent) has diverged from an
ideal standard of performance. That is the moral hazard problem.
Uncertainties surrounding the parties’ potential for behaving
opportunistically, especially if one or both parties has invested sunk costs
and the contract remains incomplete, have been neglected. The
verifiability and observability problems may impact the parties’ ability to
solve certain problems in particular ways, but the focus should remain on
imagining the various ways that parties can solve problems and achieve
their goals, given certain endemic uncertainty problems, and on how
judicial interventions would compare to private solutions in solving
parties’ problems.
59.
For a thoughtful analysis of the variety of approaches that could be used to
maximize welfare using a hypothetical bargain standard, see David Charny, Hypothetical
Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815,
1820–23 (1991) [hereinafter Charny, Hypothetical Bargains].
60.
WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 57–58.
61.
This is the “adverse selection” problem and is often used to refer to the
propensity of insureds to conceal damaging information about themselves to insurers. See
id. at 47.
62.
The famous Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), case on
consequential damages also illustrates strategic withholding of information as the miller
with the potential for higher damages would prefer not to disclose that information in
order to get a “subsidized” lower shipping price. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 51, at
101–03.
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Because parties cannot anticipate the myriad ways in which
opportunism will occur over the course of a contract, providing specific
contract provisions to control such behavior may be costly and difficult to
specify, so the contract remains incomplete.63 The opposite is also true.
If there were no uncertainty about one’s counterparty’s “propensity to
diverge,” a contract could effectively control for all possible
manifestations of the opportunistic tendency.
Concerns about strategic behavior contribute to incompleteness in
contract terms.64 In the example discussed above, the seller may refuse to
agree to a more complete contract with a more complex pricing scheme
because doing so would facilitate strategic behavior by the buyer. If the
price the buyer paid depended on the state of demand being low or high,
the buyer might falsely and strategically claim that he should pay a low
price because of low demand.65 Because the seller would not wish to
subject itself to such strategic opportunism, contracts would set a fixed
price and thus incompletely take account of the state of demand.66
Sometimes the two types of uncertainty—about the future state of
the world and about the propensity for opportunism—can both affect the
negotiation of a contract and the degree of completeness that is achieved.
The following example is illustrative. In a hypothetical sales contract, the
contract could be fixed so that a seller offers a buyer (a wholesaler) only
one price, though the worth of the goods to the buyer depends on market
demand that could be high or low.67 The buyer might prefer to have price
terms not only for the present state of demand but also alternative pricing
to meet changes in the market demand. Presumably, the more complex
pricing scheme would enhance efficiency. Ideally, the contract should set
a lower price for the buyer if the demand is low and, if the demand is low
enough, the contract should excuse the buyer’s obligation.68 In the typical
case, however, the contract will often have only one fixed price.

63.
WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 58–59; see also Battigalli &
Maggi, supra note 4, at 811 (discussing “all the possible ways that each party can take
advantage of the other, so that these actions can be prohibited by the contract”).
This problem of opportunism may also arise in precontractual negotiations. See text
accompanying infra notes 219–20.
64.
See Hadfield, supra note 45, at 159 (identifying “strategic behavior” as factor
contributing to incompleteness).
65.
See Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 36, at 273. That claim would
not be verifiable.
66.
Id.
67.
Id. at 272.
68.
Eggleston et al., supra note 12, at 104 (“[E]fficiency requires a complex
contract that releases one or both parties from their obligations if certain future states
prevail.”).
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Although it appears complete, the contract is incomplete because “it has a
one-state partition in a two-state world.”69
C.

Responses to Incomplete Contracts that Stress Informational Deficits
by Parties or Courts

Although there is a greater recognition of the inevitability of
incompleteness in contracts, the two current dominant strands for
assessing whether legal intervention in contracts is justified turn on (in the
hypothetical bargain) the comparative ability of the courts and the parties
to acquire the information they need to improve the exchange or on an
assessment of whether the court’s intervention would require it to supply
a term that required unverifiable or unobservable information (with the
new formalists).
Neither strand of scholarship differentiates sufficiently between the
two types of uncertainty concerning external states or the likelihood of
counterparty opportunism. Nor do such strands deal directly with the
“natural affliction”70 of opportunism or sunk costs in conjunction with
uncertainty about propensities to diverge. The tendency towards
opportunism is endemic in human nature. Thus, I suggest that the
problem occurs in many different contexts. It may, as Professor Robert
Scott suggests, be a byproduct of the inability of the parties to completely
specify what they want from their counterparty because of reasons of
uncertainty. 71 In any case, it exists and the failure to make opportunism a
central concern means that, to date, theories of legal intervention remain
incompletely justified.
The activist response to incompleteness emphasizes the transaction
costs that affect the parties and negatively impair their ability to get
information needed for a complete contract that takes account of future
states.72 It looks at the comparative ability of the state and the parties to
get the information and posits that when the cost of the state’s providing
for a contingency with a law-supplied rule is lower than the private costs
69.
Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 36, at 272. Consumer warranties
are also incomplete because they do not differentiate between types of buyers according to
the probability that some buyers will use the product unreasonably and make a
disproportionate number of warranty claims. Such contracts are incomplete since they fail
to distinguish between different types of buyers. A complete contract would vary the
terms of the warranty based on the buyer’s type. Id. at 273 n.3. The finding that contracts
are often simpler and less complete than one would expect has attracted notice. See
Eggleston et al., supra note 12, at 91–97; see also HART, supra note 53, at 2.
70.
Coffey e-mail (June 30, 2003), supra note 40.
71.
Scott e-mail (Feb. 11, 2004), supra note 5.
72.
See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 51, at 93 (emphasizing link between
theories emphasizing transaction costs as a source of incompleteness and willingness to
intervene with law-supplied terms).
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to the parties’ overall transaction costs, the state should intervene with
law-supplied rule. The aggregate costs of forcing many sets of
contracting parties to explicitly provide for a term may exceed the cost of
the state creating a one-time default rule that can be supplied across the
board.73
Judicial intervention is justified by an efficiency rationale based on
using a transaction-costs approach. Scholars suggest that courts should
supply default rules that mimic what “similarly situated” parties74 would
have consented to absent transaction costs.75 Supplying such default rules
would minimize the transaction costs for the parties by allowing them to
forego negotiation of every term by agreement. Such rules would be
preferred by the parties, since minimizing transaction costs would
increase the surplus available to the parties.76 This approach for filling
gaps results in majoritarian default rules.77 The technique saves the
majority of parties the transaction costs of having to explicitly specify the
terms and is designed to enhance ex ante efficiency.78
The Uniform Commercial Code (the “Code”) and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts (the “Second Restatement”) accept the efficiency
rationale for intervention and reflect an expansive role for courts in
incomplete private agreements. The Code invites courts to intervene
through law-supplied default rules that govern absent an express contrary
agreement by the parties.79 Courts play a role in incomplete contracts,
73.
When parties are dissimilar or heterogeneous, intervention by the state may
not be cost effective. See Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 36, at 282.
74.
See Scott, Formalism, supra note 7, at 849. In embracing default rules based
on “similarly situated” parties the courts are actually directed to make determinations of
hypothetical consent and “to ignore the litigating parties’ subjective intentions . . . .” Id.
75.
This method of supplying terms based on the parties’ hypothetical consent is
illustrated by Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36
J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993) (justifying fiduciary duties in hypothetical bargain terms as
“the rules the parties themselves would have chosen in a transaction-cost-free world”).
76.
These hypothetical majoritarian default rules have occasioned a variety of
criticisms including the problem of how to justify the imposition of terms without the
parties’ actual consent. See Coleman et al., supra note 23, at 641. Ayres and Gertner have
provided a different critique suggesting that in some instances where one party is
strategically concealing information, the hypothetical majoritarian default rule should be
rejected in favor of a penalty default rule “set at what the parties would not want” to force
the disclosure of information. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 51, at 91.
77.
There are other techniques courts could utilize for filling in gaps or
interpreting contracts. Instead of supplying terms that the majority of parties would have
preferred, the court could supply terms which the particular parties to the contract would
have chosen. These are known as tailored default rules. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note
51, at 91 (discussing “tailored defaults”).
78.
Of course, if there were no transaction costs, presumably the parties would
be indifferent to the rule specified. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
79.
Article 2 of the Code suggests that commercial norms will provide the source
both “for interpreting the meaning of express terms and default rules for filling contractual
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since the absence of terms will not necessarily be fatal if the parties
intended to contract and the court has a basis for finding a remedy.80 In
some instances, courts intervene by gap filling when the parties have
obviously failed to select a term, such as the delivery date for the goods or
the price.81 In other instances, courts intervene by implying an excuse
from performance, such as that based on impracticability.82 In such cases,
courts implement a law-supplied rule to deal with unforeseen exogenous
events. 83 Courts also intervene by devising rules that incorporate
commercial norms to interpret terms in contracts. Both the Code and the
Second Restatement also imply generalized performance obligations—
such as good faith84—to govern behavior in contractual agreements.
The interventionist approach solves the externality problem created
when the parties leave a gap or leave the contract incomplete by failing to
account for certain future world states or use terms whose meanings are
unclear.85 Had the parties devoted more transaction and resource costs to
clarifying all the terms used or in completing the contracts, the job for the
courts would have been far simpler. When parties fail to achieve
complete or unambiguously clear contracts and a dispute arises, court
action may occur. Because the costs of litigation do not fall entirely on
the parties who engendered the dispute, an externality arises.86 The
dispute costs are partially defrayed by the court system. 87 State supplied
gaps.” Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, In Defense of the Incorporation Strategy, in THE
JURSPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW, supra, note 137 at
193 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) (defending the incorporation philosophy
of the Code against the assault by the formalists).
80.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 18, §§ 33–34;
U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (2001).
81.
See U.C.C. §§ 2-305, 2-309.
82.
For a discussion of the complex role the foreseeability of the event alleged to
be the basis for an impracticability claim plays, see 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 28, § 9.6;
see also U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 8 (dealing with the foreshadowing issue in determining
impracticability claims).
83.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 18, § 205; U.C.C.
§ 1-304. The implied term of good faith can be considered a mandatory rule. See Ayres
& Gertner, supra note 51, at 87 (discussing immutable rules as including the duty of good
faith). But see Cohen, Implied Terms, supra note 35, at 84 (questioning the
characterization of the good faith terms as mandatory, explaining that “if one believes that
parties may write incomplete contracts for which they expect courts to fill in the gaps, the
duty of good faith or the duty of loyalty might easily be viewed as a default”).
84.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 18, § 205.
85.
Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 36, at 277. “Externalities exist
whenever some person, say X, makes a decision about how to use resources without
taking full account of the effects of the decision.” JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER,
PROPERTY 48 (5th ed. 2002).
86.
Schwartz explains “the parties do not bear the full costs of disputes; the state
bears some of these costs because it subsidizes the judicial system.” Schwartz, Relational
Contracts, supra note 36, at 277.
87.
Id.
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default rules can reduce this cost by putting into place efficient rules,
which will obviate the need for litigation and thereby increase the gains
from trade. 88 These rules are likely to be particularly efficient when they
deal with “recurrent contracting problems.”89
The new formalists echo the recognition that the future state of the
world cannot be known in advance. However, they reach the opposite
conclusion on the desirability of legal intervention. Certain proponents of
this strand emphasize a cause of completeness not previously identified as
an important component in decisions about judicial intervention: the costs
of legal intervention where courts are incompetent.90 These theorists
focus on costly intervention by courts that would require them to fill in
terms with what is essentially unknowable information at the time the
court has to render a decision.
Other proponents in the new formalist school share the recognition
that because parties will have uncertainty about the future, the contract
that they negotiate will necessarily look to a postponement of certain
aspects of the performance obligations until the state of the world has
actually materialized. However, in postponing the measuring time and
then calibrating obligations, these proponents argue that the courts should
be wary of adopting any measurement techniques which depend on
unverifiable or unobservable characteristics.91 Courts should avoid such
techniques because the parties themselves would not have adopted them.
Adoption would merely cause the reversal costs necessitated when parties
opt out of such approaches.92 Thus, if a contract remains incomplete in
certain ways—because the parties at the time they contract lack certain
information about the future state of the world and deliberately choose not
88.
Id. However, the practice of incorporation creates encrustation problems in
which courts become increasingly wedded to the default rules with the result that parties
find it difficult to opt out of the commercial norms. See Kraus & Walt, supra note 79, at
217–18.
89.
Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 36, at 277–78.
90.
See Posner, supra note 26, at 754. Formalists have also focused on a second
type of costly judicial intervention—when courts misguidedly incorporate commercial
norms in interpret contracts and in doing so displace clear express terms.
Formalists oppose the legal recognition of such norms and assert that the courts
should defer to extant norms but should resist incorporating them into contracts because of
the likelihood that courts will err when they incorporate commercial norms as part of
contract interpretation and gap filling. See Kraus & Walt, supra note 79, at 200.
In rejecting the incorporation of trade usages and other norms, the new formalists
ignore the underlying idea that parties will seek to maximize the gain from exchange
either by contractual means or, in the face of costly obstacles to contractual means to
increase gains from trade, the parties may resort to informal norms or “private strategies”
to achieve the same goal. Denying effect to those norms may actually make it more costly
for parties to achieve their goals as they will be deprived of a cost effective alternative to
an express contract.
91.
Scott e-mail (Feb. 11, 2004), supra note 5.
92.
Id.

2004:323

Taxonomy for Legal Intervention

345

to condition future performance on a particular realized state of the
world—the court should decline to intervene ex post (at breach) with a
rule that depends on that same inaccessible information.93 This approach
means that courts should generally adopt a “passive” stance when
deciding contract disputes. 94 If there is no governing contract term, then
the court should insist on compliance with the contract terms regardless of
the circumstances and should decline to add terms not expressly agreed to
by the parties.95
Two primary instrumental justifications support literalism. The first
is the belief that if the contract is incomplete because of private
information about future states of the world, 96 then courts will lack the
competence97 to complete the contracts. Second, if courts craft rules
parties themselves studiously declined to adopt, then the parties will opt
out of such rules in the future.98 If contracts are incomplete due to the
asymmetric information99 where one or both of the contracting parties
cannot observe a fact or state of the world,100 or alternatively, where the

93.
The argument against judicial intervention is predicated on a peculiar cause
of incompleteness which is tied solely to an asymmetry of information between the parties
and the court ex post, that increases the cost of judicial enforcement. Schwartz, Relational
Contracts, supra note 36, at 279. This formalists’ use of the term asymmetric information
to refer to information disparities ex post that raise judicial enforcement costs differs from
the use of asymmetric information to refer to the case that gives one party an advantage ex
ante in the bargaining process. See, e.g., A. Postlewaite, Asymmetric Information, in 1
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 133 (John Eatwell et al.
eds., 1987) (discussing several examples of asymmetric information which focus on ex
ante bargaining problems); see also George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”:
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 490–91 (1970).
94.
Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 36, at 280–83. “A contract
which is as complete as possible given these verification constraints—that is, a contract
which exploits all verifiable distinctions between states—has been labeled functionally
complete, or f-complete.” George F. Triantis, The Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms, at
5 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. Research Paper Series No. 02-7, 2002),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=311886. A contract which only incompletely
takes account of external states is “rigid,” one which incompletely specifies behavior is
characterized by “discretion.” Battigalli & Maggi, supra note 4, at 799.
95.
See Scott, Formalism, supra note 7, at 848 (calling for “literalistic”
interpretation by the courts and for curbing a more active judicial role).
96.
Asymmetric information is a term of art used by the formalists to refer to the
informational deficits affecting the courts and in some cases the parties as well.
97.
For examples of a new scholarly concern with the issue of judicial
competence in completing incomplete contracts, see generally Hadfield, supra note 45;
Posner, supra note 26; Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 36.
98.
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 6, at 547–48.
99.
See supra note 96.
100. “Briefly put, information is observable when it is worthwhile for the parties
to know it, but the costs of proving it to a third party exceed the gains; information is
verifiable when it is both observable and worth proving to outsiders.” Schwartz,
Relational Contracts, supra note 36, at 279.
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matter is observable by the parties but not verifiable to a court,101 then the
matters are “noncontractible.”102
An example of a matter that is not observable is the cost to the seller
of producing a good. Parties could condition the price that the buyer
would be willing to pay on the seller’s costs. If such information were
available, then the parties presumably could achieve efficient contracts
using cost as a payoff variable. However, because cost information is not
readily observable, parties do not condition their obligation on such
factors in their contracts.103 The formalists argue that if the cause of
incompleteness derives from such hidden information, that information
will remain inaccessible ex post, so courts will be incompetent and should
decline to intervene because intervention would be harmful.104
In other instances, information may be observable but not verifiable
to third parties. In employment contexts, the prime example of
observable but unverifiable information involves shirking by an
employee. “[A]n employer sometimes knows whether an e[m]ployee
[has] shirked, but the costs of proving shirking to an arbitrator or a court
are relatively high.”105
The formalists argue that by classifying whether the gap is due to
private information, one can determine whether or not the law’s
intervention would be beneficial. If the incompleteness in a contract
relates to information that is either unobservable or unverifiable, then
courts should decline to intervene with an expansive interpretation or with
law-supplied default rules because in such cases courts would be
supplying a rule that the parties would opt out of or supplying a rule when
they would be ill-equipped to decide what the optimal term would be. 106
If the information were unobservable, then the court could not improve
101. These formalists do not want to “have enforcement turn on facts that one or
both could not observe or establish in court.” Scott, Formalism, supra note 7, at 863.
102. Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 36, at 280.
103. See id. at 283. Another prime example of the unobservability problem and
its effects on the types of contractual arrangements can be seen in the principal agent
context. Because an agent’s effort cannot be directly observed by the principal but only
the agent, the contract cannot be conditioned on the agent’s effort. This is so even though
the optimal contract would be so conditioned. Consequently, the contract negotiated
cannot be the first best arrangement “since it cannot be conditioned directly on variables
like effort that are observed by only one party.” HART, supra note 53, at 22.
104. “This third strategy borrows from the physician’s classic injunction, ‘first, do
no harm’ . . . .” Scott, Formalism, supra note 7, at 851.
105. Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 36, at 279; see also Andrew P.
Morriss, Bad Data, Bad Economics, and Bad Policy: Time to Fire Wrongful Discharge
Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1901, 1903 (1996). This nonverifiability factor has been cited as a
justification for the at-will rule since a contrary just cause rule would require costly
verification of the cause to a neutral court. Id.
106. See Posner, supra note 26, at 753 (stating that “identifying the valuemaximizing action in any contractual relationship is likely to require information that is
not available to the court”).
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outcomes by intervening by filling the gap in the contract because it
would not be in a position to obtain the information which caused the
incompleteness. If, on the other hand, the information were observable by
the parties but not verifiable to courts, then one would suppose that the
court’s role as an outsider would prevent it from gaining the information
except at prohibitive cost. Consequently, courts should decline to
intervene.
By highlighting judicial incompetence in ferreting out private
information ex post, the new formalists have shown how judicial
intervention, which depends on such private information, can be costly in
particular instances. At the same time, that approach has unduly
circumscribed analysis of the scope of the problem of judicial
intervention. The focus is on the costs of judicial enforcement where the
particular type of judicial intervention would depend on inaccessible
information about the state of the world ex post. That narrow focus on
costly errors by courts inevitably leads to the conclusion that judicial
intervention would be unwarranted in the particular cases specified.
However, it does not address the general issue of when judicial
intervention might be warranted because it could increase gains from
trade by controlling party opportunism. Because it does not account for
the gains, but rather only accounts for the costs, it does not propose a
complete and general theory of intervention.
The new formalists focus on a particular type of uncertainty
regarding external states of the world, such as the demand for a product.
Where parties do not condition on that variable, the court should decline
to condition performance obligations using that variable. The new
formalists have made a significant contribution in highlighting the
particular difficulties that parties will have in contracting before they
know what state of world will actually materialize. They have also given
us a trenchant analysis of why parties might avoid particular solutions to
the initial problem of uncertainty. If parties do not know what will
happen to the seller’s costs in the future, then they face uncertainty ex
ante. However, despite that uncertainty, they would probably not
condition performance on a contractual term “that states ‘whenever [the
seller’s] costs rise unexpectedly, [the seller] can substitute a reasonable
alternative.’”107 Since the seller’s costs are not a verifiable item, the
buyer would presumably be reluctant to agree to such a term.
The exclusive focus on the particular strategies that parties may opt
out of, and which thus do not present a welfare-improving solution to the
uncertainty problems that parties face, interferes with an understanding of
the circumstances that may warrant legal intervention. Given the
uncertainty problems that parties face ex ante both with respect to
107.

Scott e-mail (Feb. 11, 2004), supra note 5.
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behavior and states of the world, and the inability of contract to anticipate
and provide for solutions to that uncertainty, it is important to recognize
that parties or courts could adopt a number of strategies to solve
uncertainty problems that might not require the courts to decide matters
based on inaccessible information.
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D. An Example Illustrating Why the Analysis of Particular Strategies
Parties Avoid to Solve Informational Deficits Cannot Resolve the Judicial
Intervention Question
Professor Alan Schwartz uses an example to illustrate how case
outcomes reflect the influence of the courts’ reluctance to interfere with
solutions that would force the courts into supplying a measurement term
ex post that the parties themselves avoided adopting ex ante. While it is
useful to identify such cases as a way of guiding courts away from
particular intervention strategies that would be likely to decrease welfare
by adopting rules that parties would later seek to overturn, one must also
focus on situations where the ex ante uncertainties remain the same but
the parties themselves can devise other strategies for overcoming those
uncertainties in ways that do not pose verifiability problems or which can
be solved by certain types of judicial intervention that do not raise
institutional judicial capability problems.
A manufacturer and wholesaler are faced with a decision about
whether to condition the price the wholesaler pays on the state of the
demand (high or low). The parties could condition the price on the
demand or instead agree to a unified price.108
Schwartz explains that when faced with the choice, the manufacturer
will be unwilling to enter a contract conditioned on demand if information
about demand is not available to the manufacturer.109 The reason is
simple. A complete contract conditioned on the state of demand would
prompt the buyer to claim a low demand to justify the lower price. 110
Faced with this risk, the manufacturer prefers to agree to a contract that
does not differentiate based on demand.
Schwartz concludes that in these cases “[c]ourts respond . . . by
pursuing a ‘passive’ judicial strategy that permits them to avoid making
substantive determinations.”111 The court declines to interfere and refuses
to add a term tailoring the price term to demand because the state of the
demand cannot be known by the court.
The example seems to be consistent with a theory based on judicial
informational deficits. Yet the illustration only resolves when it might be
inappropriate for a court to intervene in a particular way. By focusing on
a case in which the parties themselves opted not to base their obligations
on certain hidden informational variables, formalists have provided easy
target cases to demonstrate that judicial intervention would be unlikely to
improve outcomes.

108.
109.
110.
111.

Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 36, at 284.
Id.
Id. at 273–74.
Id. at 274.
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Where the parties have deliberately chosen not to condition
performance on certain unobservable information, the costs of judicial
intervention conditioning performance on that same inaccessible
information would be high. It seems almost a tautology to conclude that a
court would decline to intervene if doing so would require the court to
make a determination based on that same unobservable or unverifiable
piece of information.
There would be no comparative advantage to the courts intervening
in such cases and, in fact, every reason to enforce the literal terms of the
contract. In such cases “[c]ourts benefit parties more . . . by submitting to
their contractual instructions—instructions which are designed precisely
with the courts’ abilities in mind—than by flailing away in a fruitless
attempt at divining the parties’ contractual goals, or the optimal terms, or
the norms of the relationship.”112
The formalists have neglected to consider the more difficult cases
that arise when parties face the same intractable problems of uncertainty
about the state of the world and about one’s counterparty’s proclivities for
opportunistic behaviors. Even if the parties may have chosen not to adopt
a particular strategy conditioned on certain noncontractible variables, a
court may intervene if the parties’ own strategies to overcome the
uncertainty barriers to express contract solutions are more costly than
judicial intervention.
The hypothetical involving uncertainty about the state of demand can
be looked at differently in ways that illuminate a different implicit
underlying taxonomy that can be used to resolve judicial intervention
questions. In the case just referred to, the parties have uncertainty about
the future state of demand (or external state), and also uncertainty about
the likelihood of opportunistic behavior by their counterpart. The seller
will not know in advance what the buyer’s likely propensity for such
behavior is, and therefore does not know if the buyer would falsely
manipulate the terms of the contract and claim low demand to gain a low
price.
Given that uncertainty, and given the parties’ joint interest in
thwarting opportunistic behavior (since it limits the gains from trade),113
the court should decline to add a term qualifying price by the state of
demand since it will not achieve the instrumental goal of mitigating the
hazards of opportunism. In addition, as Schwartz rightly points out, the
cost of judicial enforcement could be high were the court to have to
supply a noncontractible piece of information.
Focusing on the ex post costs of judicial intervention fails to grapple
with the bargaining problem elements of the uncertainty, sunk-cost
112.
113.

Posner, supra note 26, at 752–53.
WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 63.
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opportunism taxonomy and for that reason remains incomplete. The
parties may devise certain strategies on their own to solve the various
uncertainties. An option contract114 that gives one party an option to
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer on the date of trade might suffice to solve
the uncertainty regarding future states of the world.115 The behavioral
uncertainty may also call for other strategies to prevent opportunism. In
fact, the agreement to a fixed price, rather than one that would allow for
opportunistic manipulation of the supposed demand, could itself be a
contractual device to discourage opportunism.
In focusing on particular solutions to the uncertainty problem that
entail problems of verifiability and observability, formalists have
neglected to confront why and how courts might intervene. The
verifiability of an event does not by itself justify the court’s intervention;
it only helps to explain why the court might be more or less competent in
assessing an event. Verifiability issues are part of the cost of judicial
enforcement but are not a sufficient argument for or against intervention.
The neglect of an open-ended inquiry into an intervention issue causes the
formalists to ignore other instances of law-supplied performance
obligations or terms that might be justifiable in terms of an instrumental
rationale of controlling opportunistic behavior.
III. BEYOND PARTICULAR STRATEGIES TO SOLVE INFORMATIONAL
DEFICITS: RECOGNIZING THAT UNCERTAINTY ABOUT BEHAVIOR CAN
IMPAIR THE VALUE OF EXCHANGE AND CALL FOR PRIVATE SOLUTIONS
OR JUDICIAL INTERVENTIONS
The formalists have developed a theory against judicial intervention
based on a narrow typology of a particular strategy designed to respond to
uncertainties about the future. If the parties have left the contract
incomplete and deliberately failed to condition their obligations on
variables because they do not know what the state of world on a given
matter will be or cannot describe it adequately, then the factors are
“noncontractible.”116 In such cases, the court should decline to intervene
with a term that conditions on those same unknowable factors.
Intervention by courts would be undesirable because it would cause
parties to opt out.
However, in overgeneralizing against intervention based on one sort
of typology without recognizing the limits of the inquiry, the formalists
have ignored the need for a more robust justification to explain and
rationalize parties’ own devices for solving uncertainty problems and also
114.
115.
116.

See infra note 192.
This solution might, however, cause suboptimal investment.
Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 36, at 278–80.
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judicial decisions about when intervention may be indispensable. When
one takes account of the parties’ instrumental goals, including the need to
control behavior by efficiently curbing opportunism to increase the
surplus for the parties, there may be a reason to adopt a term or liability
rule whose effect is to police opportunism.
The need for judicial intervention to police opportunism can be seen
if one focuses on another example used by Schwartz. The example shows
the limits of the verifiability factor in explaining and justifying judicial
intervention. Since the verifiability analysis focuses on factors that
parties have deliberately chosen to leave out of a contract, the analysis
often leaves little justification for court intervention. Even in those cases
where a factor such as the market price in the damages default rule is
verifiable, verifiability alone is not a sufficient reason for justifying legal
intervention because it does not take account of the parties’ overall goals.
The example involves the open quantity cases in which the parties to
a sale of goods contract leave the quantity term open. The parties cannot
predict with perfect foresight what their demands in the future will be,
since “[t]he amount that a party will find profitable to supply or demand
is partly a function of economic factors that can vary with time.”117
In these cases, the contract often affords one party discretion to
choose a quantity to supply or to purchase. The seller may agree to
supply the output he produces to a buyer, while a buyer may agree to buy
all of the products that he needs in his business. These are known
respectively as output or requirements contracts.118 During these
contracts, one party may make demands or produce output that differs
substantially from earlier output or demands.
Since the contract is incomplete in the sense that it does not specify
the particular quantities to be supplied or demanded, the question
becomes whether there is any role for the court to intervene by regulating
the quantities supplied or demanded by the parties. Resolution of that
question would be enhanced if the court recognized that the uncertainty
about the quantity needed is accompanied by a different type of
uncertainty—an uncertainty about the party afforded discretion. What is
that person’s likely predilection for acting opportunistically in the
formulation of demands or the supply of output? The law intervenes in
this context by implying a term in the form of a performance obligation of
good faith to constrain one party’s discretion. If a contract stipulates that
the buyer will buy what it needs, then the good-faith obligation serves to
regulate the amount that can actually be demanded. If a buyer demands a
quantity that a court finds to be in bad faith, then the demand will not be
117. Id. at 295.
118. Output and requirement contracts are governed by Section 2-306 of the
Code. U.C.C. § 2-306.
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enforceable and the seller will not have to meet any demands made in bad
faith.119 In other cases, the courts may find the demand to be in good faith
and allow the quantity variation to stand.
To understand quantity variations by the seller and the courts’
response, one must examine the possible reasons for the quantity
variations ex post. In some cases, a seller may reduce the quantity
supplied to the buyer because it is simply more profitable to sell on the
open market. Prices may have gone up since the execution of the
contract, making sales on the market more profitable than deliveries under
the contract.120 In other cases, there can be factors internal to the seller
that affect output, such as a loss of key employees, which means that
“[the seller] no longer can produce profitably at the contract price with
her remaining labor force.”121
According to Schwartz, the verifiability factor explains the differing
results in the cases. The law intervenes and polices the seller reducing
quantity to the buyer in a rising market because there is a factor which is
verifiable—the rising market price that has made it more profitable to sell
on the market than to the buyer.122 In the other case, where the internal
changes in the individual seller’s business are “noncontractible,”123 the
court takes a passive and therefore noninterventionist stance to the
quantity variation.124
Yet the open-quantity cases may be better explained by a broader
framework than one based solely on whether the “regulatory term would
have to condition on unverifiable information.”125 In these cases (as in
many contracts), the parties face uncertainties about exogenous events
such as the future demand for the good or output, and thus it is difficult to
draft a complete contract that accounts for all possible states of demand or
production costs. Because of the high transaction costs of a complete
contract, the contract remains incomplete.
However, the parties also face another uncertainty problem but one
which is endogenous to the parties—behavioral uncertainty that a party
119. See, e.g., Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 397
N.Y.S.2d 814, 818–19 (App. Div. 1977).
120. Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 36, at 296. Of course, if the
contract were exclusive, the seller would not have the discretion to sell to an alternative
buyer. However, the seller retains discretion over the decision to keep producing.
121. Id. In other words, the seller may have to reduce output to maintain overall
profitability.
122. Id. at 296–97. In some cases a court may actually regulate the right of a
company to selectively decide to cease production. See, e.g., Feld v. Levy & Sons, Inc.,
335 N.E.2d 320, 322–23 (N.Y. 1975).
123. Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 36, at 296.
124. Id. at 298. In this context the court will therefore find the seller’s demands
for the goods to be in good faith.
125. Id.
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may behave opportunistically in the future. Once that factor is accounted
for, the cases may be better explained in terms of a court policing
contractual adjustments to control moral hazard.
In the case of the seller reducing output to a buyer or ceasing
production because he can receive more by selling on the open market,
the seller is acting opportunistically. The court intervenes by supplying a
term of good faith (not in the contract) to constrain the seller’s conduct.
The court does not intervene with an implied term of good faith because
the conduct is verifiable, although it uses the rising market price as a
verifiable factor in its determination that bad faith has occurred.
In the other case involving quantity changes to reflect individual
changes in the seller’s business,126 the court declines to intervene or to
find bad faith. Since the case does not seem to present an instance of
opportunistic behavior but rather changes in production necessitated by
business developments, there seems to be no justification for the courts’
intervening.
Thus, while the verifiability of certain events may play a role in
determining the costs and feasibility of a court’s intervention,127
verifiability does not explain why the law chooses to imply a lawsupplied term of good-faith to constrain discretion in a requirements or
output contract, which in itself does not contain such an express term.
Rather, the intervention can be explained in instrumental terms. In these
cases there is the risk that a party will act opportunistically in adjusting
his output or demand. To control that risk and to maximize the surplus
for the parties, 128 the law implies a term of good faith and intervenes in
order to protect parties against a recurring problem of opportunism. 129
Verifiability is not the reason for the intervention even though, in the
application of the good faith test, the verifiability of a rising market price
will affect the costs of judicial enforcement of the implied term.
IV. NONLEGAL STRATEGIES FOR MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF
OPPORTUNISM
Given the limits on the parties’ ability to craft complete contracts
that can resolve frictions arising in a relationship involving specialized
investments and to control opportunism, the parties may pursue private
options control opportunism. In deciding if legal intervention is
126. Schwartz explains “that [these reasons] affect her much more than they affect
otherwise similarly situated firms.” Id. at 296.
127. Schwartz calls this the “institutional constraint.” Id. at 274.
128. WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 31, at 60.
129. Were the problem not a recurring one but an individualized problem, the cost
of a court’s intervening would be more costly as it would necessitate crafting a term for
use on a one-time basis only.
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warranted, the court should examine the feasibility and probable cost of
such devices. It should also determine whether the parties have resorted
to such devices and also whether there are transactional characteristics in
place preventing the achievement of nonlegal sanctions or rendering them
ineffective before it makes a decision about intervening to add terms to a
party’s contract or impose a liability rule.
A.

Vertical Integration

One way parties may try to manage frictions and to mitigate
opportunism is through vertical integration. Vertical integration provides
advantages over parties having to rely on contractual agreements between
separate firms to resolve disputes and make adjustments.
Parties will trade off the advantages of vertical integration against
possible costs. The possible costs may include the sacrifice of economies
of scale that sometimes accrue to outside suppliers specializing in one
In relationships involving idiosyncratic specialized
product.130
investments, however, the economies of scale are not likely to be great.
Because outside suppliers would have to gear up to make unique
investments, and because of their uniqueness, would not be able to spread
the cost of product development over many transactions, such suppliers
will not be able to achieve the efficiencies that are possible when nonunique goods are involved. Parties will also weigh the “serious incentive
and bureaucratic disabilities”131 inherent in vertically integrated
companies.
In deciding how to facilitate governance and streamline adjustments
and curb opportunism, parties will consider not only the costs and benefits
of vertical integration132 but also other possible strategies “located
between discrete market contracting at the one extreme and hierarchical
organization at the other, whereby the hazards of bilateral contracting are
attenuated with less severe sacrifices in the aforementioned incentive and
scale/slope economy respects . . . .”133 If parties decide not to integrate,
they may wish to devise other strategies ex ante to deter undesirable
(opportunistic) behavior by the other party.
B.

Nonlegal Sanctions

In deciding how to achieve their overall goals, parties themselves
have a variety of tools (beyond the change in property ownership brought
about by vertical integration) for enforcing their commitments and
130.
131.
132.
133.

WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 92.
Id. at 163.
Id. (discussing the trade-offs in vertical integration).
Id.

356

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

curbing opportunistic behavior of the other party.134 These include both
nonlegal and legal sanctions. 135 A close analysis of why and when parties
choose to rely on different types of sanctions or combinations of sanctions
(including legal and nonlegal) in different settings may help to shed light
on the ultimate question of when legal intervention through law-supplied
rules is likely to be beneficial by increasing gains from trade.
Nonlegal sanctions may consist of bonds or other types of hostages,
the “loss of reputation among market participants” and the “sacrifice of
psychic and social goods.”136 A party may post a bond, which he
automatically forfeits upon breach. Banks typically require collateral for
loans, which will be forfeited upon a breach by the debtor. The contract
provision for forfeiture of debtor collateral is an ex ante device for
assuring debtor compliance in future behavior.137 Franchisees, in effect,
post a bond when they agree to contract to sell goods specific to the
franchise at a loss if there is early termination.138 Franchisees make
transaction-specific investments including an upfront nonrefundable
franchisee fee as well as brand-name products specific to the franchisor.
In addition, typical franchise arrangements may provide for leases rather
than ownership of franchise property.139 These specific investments by
franchisees may all be sacrificed and the franchisee may incur a loss if the
franchise is terminated, thereby helping to deter cheating.140
Cheating in the franchise context could include “quality shading” 141
in which franchisees fail to maintain the high quality of product required
by the franchisor. Although this behavior might save the franchisee in
costs expended, it will harm the reputation of the franchisor and thereby
reduce overall revenues.
Where the possibility of opportunistic behavior exists, a device for
curbing this type of behavior may be required. The “hostage” created
when the franchisee invests in specialized assets whose cost cannot be
fully recouped in the event of a premature termination of the franchise
provides a means for the franchisor to control bad behavior by
134. The anterior decision is whether to make “any commitment” to the other
party at all. David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 375, 398 (1990) [hereinafter Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions] (discussing
manufacturer’s decision as to whether to make a commitment or to sell “gray market”
goods).
135. Charny’s article on this subject of nonlegal sanctions remains a powerful
treatment of the subject over a decade after it was written. See id.
136. Id. at 393.
137. Id. at 392–93.
138. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 181.
139. Id.
140. Id.; Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of “Unfair”
Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 356, 359 (1980).
141. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 181.
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franchisees. Without the mechanism, “franchisees will bid less for the
right to a territory than they otherwise would”142 because outlier
franchisees may act in ways that debase the value of the franchise.
Thus, the parties may opt for a hostage system because it promotes
efficiencies. 143 Franchisees will pay higher bids for the franchise secure
in the knowledge that the franchisor will have a means of policing
franchisees who debase the value of the franchise for everyone.
Threats to the loss of one’s good reputation can also serve as a
nonlegal sanction that deters breach.144 Credit ratings for borrowers
constitute a type of reputational sanction.145 Without having to resort to
legal proceedings, a credit rating agency can induce borrowers to honor
their obligations or risk an adverse impact on the borrowers’ credit
rating.146
Nonlegal reputational sanctions may be quite effective and provide
the “perfect substitute[s] for legal enforcement.”147 In certain settings,
parties may “recognize[] an authoritative nonlegal decisionmaker” to
enforce such nonlegal sanctions. 148 Such a decision-maker operates well
in contexts where the parties are “close-knit, ethnically or professionally
homogeneous communities.”149 Professor Lisa Bernstein’s study of the
diamond industry amongst a group of Orthodox Jews confirms the
effective use of such nonlegal sanctions in certain communities.150
Noncompliant traders in the diamond industry suffer the severe sanction
of being frozen out of future trading. This sanction assures compliance
despite the fact that legal sanction does not back up the decisions of the
decision-makers.
Nonlegal reputational sanctions can also operate effectively outside
of homogeneous communities in organized markets when a “system for
transmitting relevant information to market participants and for providing
the expertise necessary to evaluate that information”151 exists. In the bond
market, for example, the holders of bonds worry that the debtor will incur
additional debt or otherwise act in ways that threaten the security of the
bondholders’ expectations. Bondholders have a variety of options to
discourage behavior that will adversely impact them. Some of them are
142. Id. at 182.
143. Id.
144. Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions, supra note 134, at 393.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 412.
148. Id. at 409.
149. Id. at 412.
150. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 129 (1992) (detailing
expulsion and readmission of bankrupt members).
151. Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions, supra note 134, at 418.
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legally enforceable and others operate outside the legal system.
Bondholders can draft restrictive covenants prohibiting certain behavior,
and breaches of such covenants would be legally enforceable. Of course,
there are costs associated with very detailed covenants both in terms of
resource costs and in sacrifices to flexibility. 152 Bondholders could also
demand a higher interest rate to compensate for the uncertainties
associated with the issuer’s potential future opportunistic behavior or
extract more rigorous security for the debt.153 Some of these provisions
would require bondholders to resort to the legal system in the event of
breach. Others, such as the collateral required, are simply private
mechanisms in which the bondholder has required that the debtor post a
bond. In the event of default, the bondholder can simply cause a
forfeiture of the collateral.154
The most powerful nonlegal sanction is the reputational one.155 If a
borrower is to successfully enter the capital market again, he must
carefully uphold his reputation by protecting bondholders’ security by
refraining from opportunistically incurring additional debt, for example.
The failure to act in such a manner will affect the debtor’s ability to raise
capital again, since “[i]nvestors can easily learn from business reports,
SEC filings, credit reports, and other documents that the firm has incurred
new debt or embarked upon high-risk projects.”156
Nonlegal sanctions may offer advantages over legal sanctions,
including the greater admissibility of a broad range of evidence not
admissible in court,157 greater expertise by investors over courts in
judging opportunistic behavior, and greater accuracy in decision-making
because of the way in which “the market pools the judgments of many
individual participants.”158
In many cases, the reputational controls through vehicles such as
monitoring devices are sunk costs that are already in place. 159 Adding
legal sanctions in such cases may be unnecessarily duplicative.160
Finally, breaches of commitments to others may result in personal
losses. Family members who renege on commitments may be shunned at
future gatherings. Such consequences operating outside the legal system
may act as a powerful deterrent to breach.161

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 414.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 414–15.
Id. at 415.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 416.
Id.
Id. at 393.
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In judging whether nonlegal sanctions can effectively substitute for
legal sanctions it is important to consider whether the kinds of structures
that make reputational monitoring effective such as close-knit
communities, mechanisms for assessing and distributing information,
possibilities of repeat business, and the existence of organized markets
and sophisticated investors who can evaluate and price the available
information exist. These factors will become relevant in assessing
whether legal intervention should be used to supplement private
mechanisms.
C.

Option Contracts

Another private device parties may rely on to encourage investment
and contracting by controlling for the potential of party opportunism or
other risks in an uncertain environment is the option mechanism. 162
Mergers between two separate companies present a variety of uncertain
risks that can be partially controlled through options. Mergers are
complicated transactions involving many uncertainties. One uncertainty
is the uncertainty surrounding the potential success or failure of the
merger since there is at least “anecdotal evidence suggesting that half of
all mergers fail to meet their objectives.”163 There is also the risk of
uncertainty about whether valuable employees of the target will defect
after the merger.164 Uncertainty about the accuracy of the target’s
representations and financial reports and about the melding of two
separate corporate cultures may also be present. All of these uncertainties
may inhibit mergers, at least if protective safeguards are not in place.
Options operate in a merger context—whose uncertainties make
complete express contracts difficult to achieve—to control “propensities
to diverge”165 and opportunistic behavior. In a recent case reported in the
Wall Street Journal, Building Materials Holding Corp. (BMHC) designed
a deal in which it, the acquirer, initially purchased fifty-one percent of the
target, KBI Norcal, and formed a joint venture with the target owners.166
The acquiring company also held an option to acquire the remainder of
the forty-nine percent interest after two years, and after two more years,

162. My insights here build on the original insights of Ronald J. Coffey. See infra
note 168.
163. Janet Whitman, Company Finds Joint Ventures Ease Transitions, WALL ST.
J., July 3, 2002, at B10.
164. Id.
165. E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law (June 10, 2002) [hereinafter Coffey e-mail (June 10,
2002)].
166. Whitman, supra note 163, at B10.
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the contract permitted the target to insist that the acquiring company
purchase that forty-nine percent interest.167
The structure of the deal with the option device “gives the parties a
way of breaking through the inhibitions. It causes B [Buyer] to be willing
to invest in the first step. Without the partial-purchase with options
mechanism, the null contract might have prevailed.”168 The option device
insures that the target management stays around for at least two years
(and perhaps longer), giving the target and the acquirer time to meld their
companies and thereby maximize the chances of success. The design of
the option under which the target retains a forty-nine percent interest for
two years also provides an incentive for the target to keep performing at a
high level in order to continue to meet the buyer’s expectations and to
encourage the seller to exercise the option after two years. Seller is thus
encouraged to continue to invest in the joint venture in order to facilitate
the early exercise of the option by the seller. Further encouragement for
the seller to act prudently and to maximize the value of the joint venture
may also derive from the way in which the option price is set. 169 If the
option price is dependent on the future state of the firm, then “such
provisions would give Seller a chance to show that the deal is good for B
and to get a price dependent upon that showing.”170
V. BUILDING A MODEL FOR LEGAL INTERVENTION
Before resolving the normative question of whether and how courts
should intervene, and whether legal intervention would achieve certain
goals, and if so at what cost, a broad analytical structure must be devised
that goes beyond an assessment of nonlegal sanctions and the
informational deficits affecting the parties and the courts. The structure
must account for the various uncertainties that affect contracting parties.
The incomplete understanding of legal intervention stems from a
failure to take sufficient account of a distinction between both
incompleteness due to uncertainty regarding behavior and incompleteness
due to uncertainty as to the future state of the world and exogenous
events. 171 Theories justifying judicial intervention must account for how
the economizing drive by parties to mitigate conflict and control
opportunistic behavior, maximize joint welfare, and encourage investment
prompts parties to adopt private strategies to achieve those goals and
thereby maximize gains from trade. Without a recognition of the parties’
need to control for such behavior, as well as an understanding of the
barriers that interfere with such private controls, the court cannot engage
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Coffey e-mail (June 10, 2002), supra note 165.
Id.
Id.
See Battigalli & Maggi, supra note 4, at 799.
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in a cost comparison between legal and nonlegal strategies (contractual
and otherwise) to control behavior and discretion in contracts,172 and any
analysis rejecting legal intervention is premature.
The formalists focus on a particular problem that arises because
parties are “asymmetrically informed”173 about some matter such as the
future state of demand. In these circumstances, the formalists allege that
parties will avoid writing a contract that builds in a contract clause ex ante
that will measure later performance that is based on an unverifiable factor.
In such cases, courts should avoid supplying terms that the parties
themselves eschewed since they will later contract out of such rules.
In focusing on a particular strategy for measuring performance that
parties will avoid, in part because of the possibilities that such a strategy
offers for strategic behavior,174 the formalists have avoided looking at the
wide range of solutions parties or courts might have for curbing
opportunistic behavior in contract.175 In adopting an overly narrow focus
on a single strategy, the formalists have failed to provide a methodology
for or against legal intervention in a broad array of cases.
To make the necessary cost-benefit comparisons, the structure must
account for the common attributes of transactors,176 the differential
attributes of transactions, and the hazards or problems that affect
contractual relationships, together with an analysis of the causes of
incompleteness. Together these characteristics help provide realistic
models of behavior and transactions critical to understanding how parties
adapt to organize their transactions to achieve their goals, as well as the
barriers parties face to contractually controlling for the ill effects of
opportunistic behavior.
The analysis will proceed as follows. Section A will set forth a
model for understanding how to understand human behavior that
motivates transacting parties and why parties’ contracts incompletely
solve for problems that arise in a contractual relationship.177 Section B
suggests a taxonomy.
A.

Behavioral Economics

172. Controlling opportunism efficiently will provide value to the parties who
would otherwise have to devote time and resources to guard against opportunism. See
WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 10, at 60.
173. Schwartz, Relational Contracts, supra note 36, at 273.
174. Id.
175. Finally, the formalists have failed to look broadly at the many alternative
ways in which courts or rulemakers choose to intervene in contracts. See infra Section VI.
176. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 44–52.
177. The focus on a realistic model of how parties behave in contract is traceable
to many scholars in economics, including Ronald Coase, who brought attention to frictions
in contractual relationships. Economics scholars use such models “in assessing contract.”
Id. at 43.
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Understanding how parties bargain and why parties fail to achieve
complete contracts and find it difficult to deal ex ante with the myriad
frictions that will beset them over the course of a long-term relationship
requires an understanding of something as fundamental as “human nature
as we know it.”178
Prior to the work of Oliver Williamson, economists had
underestimated the importance of these behavioral assumptions.179
Moreover, such economic theorists explained economic organizations
narrowly in terms of “a response to technological features”180 and did not
address the effects of human behavior on organizational choices.
By suggesting that parties had choices in how they organized
economic institutions and that such choices were not merely a response to
technological aspects of production, institutional economics promoted a
new purposive understanding of how parties made choices to promote
certain goals.181 The central insight that rational parties organize to
minimize transaction costs offered an important alternative explanation
for various forms of corporate organization, including vertical
integration.182 Instead of explaining a phenomenon such as vertical
integration in monopoly terms, such internal organization could be
rationalized as a means of minimizing conflict, especially where large
sunk costs existed.183
Understanding the purposeful desire of parties to minimize
transaction costs permits legal decision-makers to understand why parties
would structure their economic dealings and trades in particular ways and
178. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 270 (1964). This focus
on the implications of human nature began with Frank Knight in 1922, but the full
importance of human nature in understanding how economic institutions were organized
and in how parties interacted and resolved conflict was not fully realized until publication
of Oliver Williamson’s seminal work, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism in 1985.
179. As Williamson points out, John R. Commons “recognized that economic
organization . . . often has the purpose of harmonizing relations between parties who are
otherwise in actual or potential conflict.” WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 3
(citing JOHN R. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 6 (1934)).
180. Id. at 3.
181. The primary focus was on the boundaries of the firm. Williamson’s
instrumental focus is reflected in his statement that “[a] particular task is to be
accomplished. It can be organized in any of several alternative ways. Explicit or implicit
contract and support apparatus are associated with each.” Id. at 20.
182. Id. at 28 (citing “rebuttable presumption that nonstandard forms of
contracting have efficiency purposes”).
183. Such sunk costs with the associated “lock in” effect are likely to make it
difficult to depend on market trading since “the benefits [of the specialized investment]
can be realized only so long as the relationship between the buyer and seller is
maintained.” Id. at 62; see also HART, supra note 53, at 33 (suggesting other benefit of
“increased incentive to make relationship-specific investments” where vertical integration
replaced separate companies connected by contract).
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how parties would react to certain legal interventions. The insight that
parties are rational184 and seek to minimize the costs of contracting
consistent with solving their problems and maximizing the joint surplus
suggests that parties would choose to structure their relationships and
when to opt for contractual and noncontractual solutions. “[A] complete
contract is only one form of ‘governance mechanism’ for guiding the
behavior of contracting parties.”185 Parties have a variety of mechanisms
for achieving their goals.
Such other “[a]lternative governance
mechanisms include the courts and extralegal enforcement, such as social
sanctions and reputation.”186
Parties will weigh the costs inherent in negotiating complete express
contracts with the costs of judicial enforcement and compare each of
those costs to other private mechanisms and other nonlegal mechanisms
for achieving these same goals. Whether courts should intervene in
incomplete contracts with a term or remain passive should also be part of
a comparative cost analysis to determine whether legal intervention would
achieve certain goals with greater effectiveness. Williamson’s ideas help
in two crucial ways. First, his insights into the common behavioral
attributes of man and of the characteristics of transactions help to explain
why parties cannot solve potential problems by express contract when
there is a confluence of bounded rationality, sunk costs, and opportunism.
Second, his insight that parties want to adopt the most efficacious means
of solving their problems, including opportunism, 187 might suggest to a
court interpreting a contract or grappling with an incomplete contract that
the parties would want the court to intervene if such intervention were the
most effective means of reducing transaction costs.
B.

Taxonomy

Three attributes—uncertainty, sunk costs, and opportunism—make it
very difficult for parties to resolve problems, such as party opportunism,
or to achieve flexibility by contractual means. Because of the difficulty
of achieving complete contractual solutions, parties may turn to private
ordering and alternative mechanisms of private “governance structures”188
as the most efficient means of solving their problems and maximizing the

184. Despite their increased recognition of the limits on rationality, the
institutional economists continued to believe that parties were rational. See WILLIAMSON,
CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 45.
185. Cohen, Implied Terms, supra note 35, at 82 (citation omitted).
186. Id.
187. See WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 46 (discussing
organizational preferences based on perceived differences in efficacy of curbing
opportunism).
188. Id at 63. Arbitration is one such private structure.
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gains from trade which would otherwise be dissipated from the losses
flowing from unfettered opportunism. 189
Parties negotiating contracts are beset by two types of uncertainty as
well as cognitive limitations on their ability to detect future contingencies
which will “affect the payoffs to the parties.”190 The inability to foresee
future contingencies (or to foresee them only with very costly
expenditures of time and research) leads parties to enter into incomplete
contracts. A simple example will suffice.
Imagine a buyer, B, who requires a good (or service) from a
seller, S. Suppose that the exact nature of the good is uncertain;
more precisely, it depends on a state of nature which is yet to be
realized. In an ideal world, the parties would write a contingent
contract specifying exactly which good is to be delivered in
each state.191
In the real world, however, the resulting contract will be incomplete
because of the expenses that the parties would have to assume to find out
what the future state of the world will be.192
189. See id.
190. James M. Malcolmson, Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets, 35 J. ECON.
LIT. 1916, 1917 (1997); see also Eggleston et al., supra note 12, at 100 (“As a matter of
theory, one can talk about contracts being fully state-contingent, allocating obligations
efficiently for every payoff-relevant future state of the world.”). This assumption of
bounded rationality is the operative assumption for transaction-cost economics, and it
limits the ability of parties to achieve their goal of controlling opportunism.
191. Hart & Moore, supra note 56, at 115.
192. See id. To some extent the problems in describing the uncertain future state
of the world ex ante by contract can be solved by giving an option to the party who is
required to make an investment the right to make a “take-it-or-leave-it offer” at the date of
the trade. Id. at 118. Then, even if the goods to be traded cannot be described ex ante
since it depends on a yet to be realized state of nature, so long as the parties can actually
observe and describe the state of nature at the trade date (even if it is not verifiable), the
optimal contract can be achieved even without the goods being describable ex ante. See
Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV.
ECON. STUD. 83 (1999). The take-it-or-leave-it option mechanism in effect overcomes the
describability problem. See Hart & Moore, supra note 56, at 115–16, 119. The
applicability of this substituted option mechanism, as a way of overcoming the
describability problem, is a private device parties can use to overcome ex ante
describability problems and is of limited usefulness here. First, it depends on there being
no ability to renegotiate the contract. See id. at 120. Without that guarantee, the incentive
to invest is diluted and a written contract is no better than a null contract (that is, no
contract). See id. Second, the device of a contract with a built-in option to be exercised at
the trade date, once the state of the world has been realized, is of limited usefulness when
the uncertainty concerns behavioral uncertainty. In that case, although the exact nature of
the way in which the opportunistic behavior will be realized must await the passage of
time, it is certain that such divergence will occur. Moreover, postponement of the trade
and price until a later juncture (as exists in the option contract) will not be effective
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Uncertainty also means that ex ante parties cannot detect how the
other party behaved in the past because of strategic behavior to conceal
damaging information and there is uncertainty about the likelihood that
they will act opportunistically in the future.193
The true significance that the condition of uncertainty poses for
contracting parties, however, cannot be understood without analyzing two
other characteristics: opportunism and asset-specificity.
Opportunism is defined as “self-interest seeking with guile.”194 It
refers also to the “incomplete or distorted disclosure of
information . . . .”195 Parties to a relationship may have a propensity to act
opportunistically and to act strategically by exploiting the relationship “in
order to benefit from the relationship without conferring an equivalent
benefit on the other party to the relationship.”196 Such opportunism may
arise when one party makes specialized investments. The person making
such investments may be subject to “hold up” by the other party.197
because at that point, the advantaged party has an incentive to exploit the sunk costs and to
act strategically. Finally, the option mechanism that postpones a trade or an action until a
later date will not work when the actor “must react quickly to contingencies, and playing a
mechanism [with the other actors] before taking action is out of the question.” Battigalli
& Maggi, supra note 4, at 801 n.6 (discussing the example of a babysitter or agent having
to make a decision before consultation with the child’s parents).
Contract is replete with examples of incomplete contracts. Parties in requirements
contracts who do not know what their future need for a good will be leave the contract
incomplete, promising today to buy what their requirements turn out to be in the future.
Similar uncertainty afflicts an employment contract since the employer does not know ex
ante how much effort an employee or agent will exert; the level of amount of the effort is
unknown at the time that the contract is negotiated. If there were perfect foresight about
the employee’s projected level of effort, then the contract could condition payment on a
certain level of effort being exerted. Many factors will interfere with such a complete
contract including the fact that the employer cannot observe the employee’s actions or
level of effort directly. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS
AND AGENTS : THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37, 38–39 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985). Moreover, it might be difficult to verify the level of effort for a
neutral court. For that reason many contracts between a principal employer and an agent
remain less complex than might be expected.
193. Coffey e-mail (June 30, 2003), supra note 40.
194. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 30.
195. Id. at 47. In the insurance context, opportunism of this kind refers
specifically to the adverse-selection problem by insureds who do not wish to disclose their
true propensities for risk.
196. Interview with Peter M. Gerhart, Professor of Law Case Western Reserve
University School of Law, at Case Western Reserve University School of Law (June 26,
2003).
197. See Patrick W. Schmitz, The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A
Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory, 53 BULL. ECON. RES. 1, 4 (2001); see also
WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 52–56; George M. Cohen, The NegligenceOpportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 941, 987–88 (1992).
This “hold-up” problem may lessen the incentive to invest. Preserving the incentive
to invest in contexts involving opportunism is explored in Tom K. Lee and I.P.L. Png, The
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Sunk costs or asset specificity refers to investments made that cannot
readily be redeployed except at great loss.198 The presence of sunk costs
and opportunism are critical for understanding how parties bargain and
even organize their economic institutions.
Their importance for
contracting should not be underestimated.
In any transaction parties can choose between “special purpose and
general purpose investments.”199 To understand this concept, an example
may be useful. Where B refers to buyer and S refers to seller, “[s]uppose
that in order to realize the benefits of the input, B must first make an
investment [‘a’] which is specific to S; for example, B might have to build
a plant next to S.”200 The choice by buyer to invest in such assets will
often have benefits to the parties; there may in fact be “cost savings
afforded by the special purpose technology.”201 For example, locating the
plant next to the seller may result in greater efficiencies in terms of
reduced transportation costs or other special advantages afforded by the
particular location.202
The presence of such sunk costs, however, may foster opportunities
for strategic behavior. In the above example before the investment by
buyer, if problems or frictions develop during the trading relationship,
then the buyer is free to simply buy products on the open market from
another seller. Once asset-specific knowledge or investment has been
made or acquired, “[p]arties engaged in a trade that is supported by
nontrivial investments in transaction-specific assets are effectively
operating in a bilateral trading relation.”203
Because of the specialized investments, the parties are locked into
the relationship; they cannot recoup their investments if they exit the
relationship. 204 A long-term contract would provide the logical means of
advance planning for situations that will involve the lock-in effect and
possible monopoly power.205
If parties have unbounded rationality, the parties are opportunistic
and the assets are specific, then the parties could solve their problems ex

Role of Installment Payments in Contracts for Services, 21 RAND. J. ECON. 83, 95 (1996)
(exploring law-supplied installment payment scheme as a means of preserving incentive to
invest).
198. Sunk costs refer to special purpose investments. See WILLIAMSON,
CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 54.
199. Id.
200. Hart & Holmstrom, supra note 20, at 129.
201. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 54.
202. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 21, at 1267–68.
203. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 30.
204. Hart & Holmstrom, supra note 20, at 72.
205. Id.
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ante by contract.206 A prime example illustrating these assumptions is
In principal-agent literature,
known as “mechanism design.”207
economists recognize that agents will be prone to shirking and that the
parties will invest specific assets in the relationship. Nevertheless,
because it is assumed that parties have unbounded rationality, a contract
can solve all potential problems in advance.
If one assumes, by contrast, that parties are subject to cognitive
limitations and there is asset specificity but no opportunism, the presence
of bounded rationality will inevitably lead to contractual gaps. 208
However, the parties could still reach a private contract to solve potential
frictions. They could adopt a simple “self-enforcing general clause” 209
and “pledge[] at the outset to execute the contract efficiently (in a joint
profit maximizing manner) and to seek only fair returns.”210 Parties
would proceed to execute the contract, and because parties were not
opportunistic, they would abide by their promise to act fairly when
problems arose.
The third scenario involves only two of the three characteristics and
would consist of opportunistic parties with limits on rationality but no
asset-specific investments. If sunk costs are absent, then even if parties
cannot foresee potential problems and even if parties were to act
opportunistically at a juncture in their relationship, it would not matter
because parties could simply exit the relationship and sell or buy their
products or services to another party.211
When there is a confluence of all three behavioral characteristics as
is often the case in contractual relationships, it becomes difficult to solve
problems by contract ex ante. Bounded rationality will mean that the
contract will contain gaps as parties will not be able to foresee all
contingencies affecting payoffs and provide for them by express contract.
Uncertainty about parties’ proclivities for opportunism will also hamper
express contractual solutions. The presence of opportunism itself means
that even a general clause promising to act fairly will not be effective as a
means of filling the incomplete contract because of “the unenforceability
of general clauses [without intervention] and the proclivity of human
206. See WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 30–31 (“Given unbounded
rationality, a comprehensive bargain is struck at the outset, according to which appropriate
adaptations to subsequent (publicly observable) contingent events are fully described.
Contract execution problems thus never arise . . . . Contract, in the context of unbounded
rationality, is therefore described as a world of planning.”).
207. See Roger B. Myerson, Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem,
47 ECONOMETRICA 61 (1979).
208. WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 31.
209. Id. The simplicity of the clause is due to bounded rationality. Williamson
calls this the “world of promise.” Id.
210. Id.
211. Williamson calls this the “world of competition.” Id. at 32.
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agents to make false and misleading (self-disbelieved) statements . . . .”212
Finally, the presence of sunk costs and bilateral monopoly will mean that
“both buyer and seller are strategically situated to bargain over the
disposition of any incremental gain whenever a proposal to adapt is made
by the other party.”213 When these three characteristics converge,
“[g]overnance structures that attenuate opportunism and otherwise infuse
confidence are evidently needed,”214 and ex ante the parties would want a
structure in place that can most efficiently control contractual hazards.
C.

Will Judicial Intervention Foster More Opportunism?

One potential concern with judicial intervention in incomplete
contracts that is voiced by the new formalists is that courts could actually
lead to opportunistic behavior and increase moral hazard.
The new formalists argue that “courts trying to solve information
problems ex post create moral hazard (or opportunism) for future
parties.”215 This dynamic may arise if a court intervenes to condition
parties’ obligations on nonverifiable factors (such as demand).
Intervention by a court in such a case would give one party an
opportunity, such as a buyer, to falsely claim low demand to get a price
break. The cost of intervention, if it took the form of a default rule, would
be too high and therefore should be avoided. Otherwise, parties would
have to undertake the cost of opting out of such suboptimal rules in the
future.
If courts act to police opportunism in a particular case using the
taxonomy suggested in this Article, the fear is the emergence of a default
rule that fosters opportunism in future cases. 216 Yet, the possibility that
the legal interventions described here will backfire by fostering
counteropportunism seems remote for several reasons.
The fact that a court supplying terms to fill in terms in incomplete
contracts (as by conditioning the price on the demand even when not
stated in the contract) might foster opportunism should not be used as a
sustained logic against all types of legal intervention in incomplete
contracts. The danger that courts can intervene in such a way as to
unleash opportunistic behavior by the counterparty is a real possibility.
However, the concern that a particular type of intervention-by-courts
rule—to supply terms eschewed by the parties—could actually foster
moral hazard by parties is predicated on a narrow example. While it may
212.
enforceable.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 63. Such clauses may also face the problem that they may not be
Id.
Id.
Id.
Scott e-mail (Feb. 11, 2004), supra note 5.
Id.
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be true for the particular circumstances described by the new formalists,
the danger of counteropportunism from a law-supplied rule or term is not
great across the board. In fact, the suggestion that the law should
intervene with a law-supplied liability rule or term when the costs of
doing so can more effectively curb opportunism than private mechanisms
is one that would be preferred by the parties ex ante as a means of
increasing gains from trade.
There are several reasons why the law-supplied liability rules or
terms (governing precontractual negotiation, unilateral contracts, goodfaith obligations, and subcontracting) may be desired by both parties ex
ante and would not create moral hazard that would cause parties to opt
out of such rules. First, the possibility of opportunism may be mitigated
by the fact that the nature of the suggested grounds for legal intervention
could serve to police opportunistic behavior by either party across a
variety of transactional settings. If either party could demonstrate the
structural impediments impairing complete bargains, including
uncertainty, sunk costs, and opportunism, that party might be able to get
the court to invoke a law-supplied rule if the private strategies for curbing
opportunism were more costly. One example of legal intervention where
either side could allege a breach of an obligation of the law-supplied term,
arises with good faith. Either the buyer or the seller might be able to
argue that the requirements demanded or the output supplied was made in
bad faith. In such instances, the danger that one party could use the law’s
intervention to opportunistically exploit the other would be mitigated by
the prospect of a countersuit.
In promissory estoppel cases, unlike the intervention by courts to
supply nonverifiable terms that give one party a legal basis for acting
opportunistically, the liability rule imposed on promisors in promissory
estoppel cases curbs opportunistic behavior by promisors in a case where
contractual solutions and private devices (such as monitoring, bonding,
and screening) are costly solutions to a recurrent problem and increases
social welfare. Without the liability rule, promisees will be reluctant to
rely.
Because they will be uncertain about the proclivities for
opportunism by promisors, they will not be able to judge whether it is safe
to rely without an enforceable contract. Without the liability rule,
promisees will take account of the danger of moral hazard by withholding
reliance since there is no way yet to account for the moral hazard in the
price of the contract since there is not yet a contract.
Even if there is some potential for opportunistic behavior by
promisees who are now protected, the danger of counteropportunism by
the protected party is mitigated by the fact that reliance is only protected
to the extent that it is reasonable. Moreover, because the promissory
estoppel cases impose liability on promisors for expenditures that they
requested to help them reduce uncertainty about the promisee, it is
reasonable to suppose that promisors as a class ex ante would want to be
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liable if the alternative were less reliance by promises and greater
uncertainty for promisors.
In other cases, the danger of the law’s intervention causing moral
hazard also seems remote. Where sunk costs fall largely on one side, as
in the Section 45 unilateral contract situation of the Second Restatement,
the possibility that the party with sunk costs would be able to
opportunistically exploit the other party who has minimal sunk costs
would seem small. The party who has requested a performance can
simply exit the relationship and buy alternative services or goods on the
market. Thus, in certain cases the absence of parity in the degree of sunk
costs may provide a natural barrier to counteropportunism possibilities.
Finally, the suggested taxonomy for assessing the merits of legal
intervention merely posits that in cases where uncertainty, sunk costs, and
opportunism interfere with the parties’ own abilities to control for
opportunism, and where the costs of a law-supplied rule or term are
cheaper than the private strategies for achieving the same goals, then it
makes sense to supply such a rule and thereby increase gains from trade.
The suggested taxonomy is not inconsistent with the work of the new
formalists who counsel against intervening with unverifiable terms that
the parties avoided because of the possibilities such terms would offer for
strategic behavior. In such cases, the taxonomy would agree and counsel
against such forms of interpretation as it would not increase gains from
trade.
VI. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL: PRECONTRACTUAL NEGOTIATION,
SECTION 45 CONTRACTS, AND CONTRACTING
This model, in which behavioral uncertainty, opportunism, and sunk
costs converge and make it difficult and costly to constrain, the effects of
behavioral opportunism by contract can be seen in many different
contexts. The model is useful in understanding recent doctrinal
developments that have seemingly curbed the parties’ freedom from
contract by expanding liability in areas previously immune from contract.
The increase in contractual liability in settings involving both uncertainty
and behavior may begin to make sense if the effect of these matters on the
“form of the incompleteness that is caused by unforeseen events”217 is
analyzed. If parties are uncertain about behavior that needs to be
controlled, then they will omit sentences that effect such controls that will
result in more “discretion to the agent.”218 This Article posits that the
form of incompleteness associated with behavioral uncertainty—
discretion—may need to be controlled by courts if private strategies are
217.
218.

Battigalli & Maggi, supra note 4, at 811.
Id. at 806.
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too costly. The law has begun to intervene in several areas. The form of
intervention is slightly different in each case but the effect of the
intervention is to control or regulate unbridled discretion and thus to curb
opportunism. The effect of such interventions may be to create a default
rule to police opportunistic behavior.
The first example of intervention arises in precontractual
negotiations. In such settings, uncertainty, moral hazard, and sunk costs
converge. The promisee faces the prospect that the promisor will act
opportunistically by exploiting sunk costs that the promisee invests on the
advice and perhaps at the request of the promisor.219 These sunk costs
help to reduce uncertainty about the promisee and thus function as a
screening device for the putative promisor. This problem, however,
cannot easily be solved ex ante through contracting. The promisee cannot
foresee all of the potential choices the promisor will face in the
negotiations and thus bounded rationality constrains a detailed express
contract. Even a general clause by which the promisor promises to act
fairly is unfeasible. Although such clauses are easier to negotiate where
bounded rationality limits the ability to agree on detailed contracts, the
promisee will not believe the promisor and will not rely on such
clauses. 220
Another alternative would be for the parties to subdivide the various
performance steps taken by the promisee and to price each of them in
such a way as to be acceptable to both parties in the precontractual
context. Achieving those sub-bargains for each phase of performance,
however, is likely to be costly. Because of the costs of the private subbargains, the barriers and costs to controlling the promisor’s behavior by
detailed express contracts and the likely infeasibility of general clauses
promising generalized cooperation, judicial intervention through a
liability rule may be warranted as the least costly alternative and may help
to explain why contract law chooses to impose a liability rule on
promisors even when the parties have failed to achieve a completely
explicit bargain.
The model presented here may be useful in identifying other
circumstances in which a law-supplied rule may be the most efficacious
solution to the opportunism problem. One such setting involves the
partial performance doctrine applicable to unilateral contracts.221 The
Second Restatement provides that if an offeror requests performance as
the exclusive means of acceptance and the offeree begins performance,
219. The promisor often seeks information from the promisee to screen the worth
of the promisee’s reliance investments. For a detailed discussion of the role of legal
intervention in precontractual negotiation, see Kostritsky, supra note 27, at 641–44.
220. Such clauses may not be enforceable. See WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra
note 10, at 63.
221. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 18, § 45.
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the offer becomes irrevocable. 222 In effect, the law implies a term of
irrevocability that is not expressly agreed to by the parties. That form of
legal intervention may be justified by the framework suggested here. The
transactional setting involves one-sided sunk costs invested by the offeree
which heighten the danger that an offeror will act opportunistically by
letting the offeree begin performance and then revoking the offer and
offering less favorable terms or seeking an alternative contractual partner.
The sunk costs will make it difficult for the offeree to pursue a simple exit
strategy on the market with an alternative partner because the offeree’s
transaction specific assets may not be redeployable. Bounded rationality
or limits on the ability to perceive the future may make it difficult to craft
an express detailed contract controlling all the varieties of offeror
opportunism.
The same taxonomy can be applied to the subcontracting cases. In
these cases, the court confronts the issue of whether they should intervene
by implying a term of irrevocability for the subcontractor’s offer. The
subcontracting context is subject to a variety of factors that interfere with
the achievement of a fully contingent bargain that would protect the
reliance by either party. There is uncertainty about future events: the
general contractor cannot unconditionally promise to use the
subcontractor because it is uncertain whether the general contractor will
be awarded the overall contract. Yet, the general contractor must rely by
using the subcontractor’s bid, thereby leaving the general contractor
vulnerable should the law impose liability only when there is a fullfledged reciprocal bargain.
The court has decided to limit the
subcontractor by eliminating his power to revoke.
Thus, transactional settings of precontractual negotiation, unilateral
contracts, and subcontracting present a class of cases in which the
recurring threat of opportunism is virtually the same threat throughout a
class of transactions: those involving an offer followed by partial
performance by the offeree. For that reason, a law-supplied rule
controlling the opportunism with a law-supplied term of irrevocability
may be the cheapest form of controlling the offeror’s opportunism and
thereby maximizing the surplus for the parties. If the threat presented in
each case is of the same nature, then it would seem that a law-supplied
rule which can be supplied uniformly by a one-time default rule is likely
to be more efficient than requiring each party to draft specific contractual
protections. It may also be more efficient than some of the private
bonding mechanism since they would have to be negotiated
individually. 223
222. Id. at cmt. d.
223. It may also be possible to rationalize a law-supplied rule such as an implied
reasonable notice provision for termination in franchise contracts that are silent on
whether any notice is required. Arguably the transactional setting involves sunk costs by
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VII. CONCLUSION: REASSESSING JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN AN
IMPERFECT WORLD
Legal intervention to supply terms (such as promises of
irrevocability) or to impose liability in precontractual negotiations
seemingly represent incursions on the parties’ freedom from contract.
Yet, it is possible to look at these “incursions” as efforts by courts to
increase the parties’ joint gains by successfully serving the instrumental
goal of controlling opportunism when other methods remain more costly.
Parties have a variety of means to control hazards in contractual
relationships and thereby increase gains from trade. Because of the high
costs associated with expressly controlling the opportunism by express
contracts, parties use many devices, including nonlegal sanctions or
vertical integration to control for opportunism.
The fundamental question for the legal system looks beyond these
private devices to ask when, if ever, courts should intervene in resolving
incomplete contracts, by supplying terms or performance obligations or
liability rules, when the parties have failed to expressly bargain for them?
Although neoclassical contract theory and the Code consciously embraced
an activist approach to incomplete contracts, the new formalists have
recently called for a retrenchment of judicial activism. Such formalists
argue courts that can do more harm than good when they seek to
intervene by supplying terms that depend on inaccessible information or
when they seek to judicialize informal norms.
This Article has argued that the formalists have taken an unduly
restrictive approach to determining whether law-supplied terms or
liability rules can be justified. By focusing on instances where the parties
themselves have chosen not to condition performance on certain
inaccessible data, and condemning judicial intervention that seeks to
supply such information, the formalists have avoided grappling with a
comprehensive methodology for justifying law-supplied rules. That
methodology should take an instrumental approach to determine whether
the franchisee (not redeployable) and that leaves the franchisee vulnerable to opportunistic
behavior by franchisors. Contract clauses, either the specific kind or the more general
cooperative clause, are unlikely to be effective because of the bounded rationality problem
or because of the tendency to disbelieve general pledges to be cooperative. WILLIAMSON,
CAPITALISM, supra note 10, at 63 n.23. However, the franchisee situation presents
opportunism of another sort: shirking by franchisees, which may debase or dilute the value
of the franchise name. Id. at 180–81. Thus, the reason that the court may decline to
intervene with a reasonable-notice provision is that the specific investment acts as a kind
of hostage provided by the franchisee, which will deter him from engaging in bad
behavior which would subject him to early termination. Id.; cf. Schwartz, Relational
Contracts, supra note 36, at 306 (explaining judicial disinclination to imply a reasonablenotice provision because doing so would require the court to award damages which
depended on unverifiable information).
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legal intervention would advance or hinder goals, such as maximizing
joint surplus, controlling party opportunism, providing incentives to rely
on and invest in contracts and maximizing welfare and at what cost. A
full accounting of the costs and benefits of legal intervention must
consider the feasibility of private strategies for achieving those goals. A
broad methodology for justifying legal intervention, which also identifies
specific constituent elements where legal intervention is likely to be
welfare enhancing, would help to explain when judicial activism would
be warranted and counter the formalists’ calls for a retrenchment of
judicial intervention. It would also reconceptualize incursions on the
parties’ freedom of contract as welfare enhancing.
In this Article, I have assumed that courts interpreting contracts will
and ought to explicitly consider what rules will promote efficiency in
contract formation. Specifically, courts should be concerned with
implementing rules that maximize social wealth and minimize transaction
costs for the parties. In reaching such conclusions about whether legal
intervention would achieve such efficiency in incomplete contracts, rulemakers ought to advert to economic models of bargaining and to the
behavioral attributes of the parties.
To determine whether and when courts should intervene one must
begin with Ronald Coase’s insight that absent transaction costs, it would
not matter which legal rule were adopted.224 If a court adopts a legal rule
that is in fact suboptimal, then the parties would simply bargain around
the initial rule and achieve an optimal outcome on their own.225 With
transaction costs, however, the parties may not be able to achieve an
optimal outcome and thus, the choice of the initial legal rule may be
important. To choose the rule that would be preferred by the particular
parties to the transaction, the court may lack access to the data that would
tell it which rule would be optimal. Nevertheless, to save the parties
transaction costs, courts opt for default rules that the majority of parties
would prefer. “Where transaction costs are too high for parties to fashion
their own rule, it nonetheless is normatively correct to provide them with
the rule that they probably would have chosen for themselves at the time
of contracting had they been able to bargain.”226 Idiosyncratic parties
may of course opt out of the law-supplied rule.
Whether a court should intervene with a term or a law-supplied
obligation should depend on a number of considerations. Some of these
considerations relate to the characteristics of the transaction and to human
behavior, some relate to the effectiveness and cost of nonlegal sanctions
in the particular context, some relate to the nature of the legal intervention
224.
225.
226.

Coase, supra note 78, at 15–16.
Id. at 15.
Scott, Formalism, supra note 7, at 850.
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being called for, and some relate to whether the parties have opted for a
comprehensive structure of nonlegal alternatives.
To determine whether legal intervention would be value-maximizing
in any particular case, one must first grapple with whether there is a
confluence of bounded rationality, sunk costs, and opportunism. Since
bounded rationality and opportunistic tendencies are characteristic of
human nature, the only question would be whether there are sunk costs.
Absent sunk costs, a party encountering disruption in a relationship could
simply resort to the market and it would not be necessary for the law to
intervene in any way. With sunk costs and the presence of bounded
rationality and opportunism, the possibility of completely contingent
contracts is unrealistic, making the need for private alternative
mechanisms or legal intervention a necessity for controlling the inevitable
frictions in a contract.
The second constituent element in any determination of whether
legal intervention is justified is the existence of and likely effectiveness of
nonlegal sanctions. Determinations of effectiveness of such sanctions
should consider three factors: (1) whether there are informational
structures in place for disseminating information;227 (2) whether there are
already sunk costs in place, which help to provide nonlegal sanctions; 228
and (3) whether the context involves a homogeneous community that can
effectively disseminate reputational information.229
The third element should consider whether there is a mechanism by
which the price can be discounted to reflect the absence of private
protective safeguards to control opportunism. If the context involves the
sinking of costs before a price mechanism is negotiated, then a lawsupplied obligation might be the only mechanism to induce parties to
invest sunk costs. Without a law-supplied obligation, the party might be
reluctant to invest any sunk costs which might be desired by the other
party.
Fourth, in determining whether legal intervention would be
beneficial, one should focus on the nature of the intervention being called
for. Is the court asked to intervene in such a way that doing so would
require the court to supply information about external states of the world
which are noncontractible and which the parties themselves deliberately
failed to condition on? If so, then the court should probably decline to
intervene if intervention would require the court to supply such
noncontractible information. If, on the other hand, the court is asked to
intervene with a law-supplied obligation to curb a recurring problem of
227.

The bond market provides one example of such a structure. See supra note

228.
229.

Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions, supra note 134, at 416.
The close-knit diamond industry furnishes one such example. See supra note

151.
150.
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opportunism and it is clear that private devices would be more costly
because they would have to be negotiated seriatim, then there is reason
for the court to intervene to achieve welfare improvement.
Fifth, the court should determine whether the parties have opted out
of legal sanctions by structuring their transaction to avoid incurring a
legal commitment, or alternatively, subscribed to a comprehensive
structure of nonlegal sanctions (as in the case of a centralized nonlegal
arbitrator). The presence of a comprehensive structure of nonlegal
sanctions lessens the reason for court intervention and the absence of such
a structure or of the possibility of effective nonlegal sanctions suggests a
potential role for judicial intervention.
Finally, the court should determine whether the parties have been
able to achieve a finely crafted device to control for opportunism in an
uncertain world. The option contract provides one example. The
presence of such elaborate devices may indicate that judicial intervention
is less necessary, at least in circumstances where the parties can structure
an option that can help the parties overcome some of their reluctance to
invest in an uncertain partner.
When a court is asked to add terms or liability rules beyond those
expressly agreed to by the parties to a contract or not part of their usual
meaning, it must decide whether legal intervention is justified. Because
parties have often not signaled their intentions on the desirability of the
law-supplied terms (or even mentally adverted to such terms) the court
must decide, using models that will project consequences on ex ante and
ex post behavior, whether the legal intervention will maximize gains from
trade.
Current commentators—the new formalists—have suggested that
courts reject legal intervention in incomplete contracts and instead limit
their role to the literal enforcement of the express terms agreed to by the
parties. Their argument for a modest judicial role is premised on the
notion that in cases where the contract is incomplete because the
information about external states of the world is not observable or not
verifiable, the courts should decline to intervene because without access
to the information, they cannot improve outcomes for the parties.
This Article has suggested that the current assault on judicial
intervention in incomplete contracts with its concomitant narrowing of
freedom from contract pays insufficient attention to behavioral sources of
incompleteness and focuses too narrowly on one form of institutional
incompetence. In so doing, the formalists have missed the central point
that legal intervention may be indispensable as a means of curbing
opportunistic behavior, rather than incursions on the freedom not to
contract.
This Article has suggested methodology that identifies the
characteristics of parties’ relationships (sunk costs, opportunism, and
uncertainty), which will make private efforts to control opportunism too
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costly and also identifies constituent elements of an analysis that will
allow the court to decide whether legal intervention is likely to be
superior to nonlegal sanctions.

